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Abstract: In this thesis I show with three studies how field experiments can enhance our understand-
ing of labor markets. Economists traditionally assume that individuals exclusively respond to monetary
incentives. As a consequence, if workers have no prospect of future employment at the firm and pay is
not contingent on their performance, a wage change should not affect effort. Some economists, however,
have recognized that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit our progress in under-
standing incentives. In Chapters 2 and 3, I investigate the role of psychological motives like the desire to
reciprocate in the context of a real‐life work environment. The first experiment explores the impact of a
wage increase on work performance when there is no economic reason for workers to change their effort.
I find that workers reciprocate a generous wage with higher performance, particularly those workers who
care about fairness and felt underpaid prior to the wage increase. The second experiment investigates
the effects of a wage cut on performance when either all workers in a team or only some of them suffer
the cut. I show that a general pay cut reduces performance, while a wage cut for only some of the
workers reduces their performance more than twice as much. This finding demonstrates the powerful
force of social comparison and the need to build the social nature of humans into economic theory. In
Chapter 4, I examine the joint effects of monetary incentives and social interaction on work performance.
Many jobs offer wage schemes that create positive or negative externalities on coworkers. Whether or
not workers have the possibility to interact socially at work may distort the intended incentives of these
schemes. I find that under relative incentives, when own effort imposes a negative externality on the
coworker’s income, social interaction works against monetary incentives and leads to low performance
due to collusion. However, the more workers differ in skills the less able they are to sustain collusive
agreements. In der vorliegenden Dissertation zeige ich anhand von drei Studien wie Feldexperimente
unser Verständnis von Arbeitsmärkten verbessern können. Ökonomen gehen traditionell davon aus, dass
Individuen ausschliesslich auf materielle Anreize reagieren. Wenn also Arbeitskräfte keine Aussicht auf
eine langfristige Anstellung haben und deren Lohn nicht von der Leistung abhängt, dann sollte eine Lohn-
veränderung keinen Einfluss auf die Arbeitsleistung haben. Manche Ökonomen haben jedoch erkannt,
dass diese Sichtweise des menschlichen Verhaltens beschränkt ist und unseren Fortschritt im Verständnis
von Anreizen bremsen kann. In den Kapiteln 2 und 3 untersuche ich die Bedeutung von psychologischen
Motiven wie Fairness oder Reziprozität in echten Arbeitsumgebungen. Das erste Experiment untersucht
den Einfluss einer Lohnerhöhung auf die Arbeitsleistung, wenn Arbeitskräfte keinen ökonomischen Grund
haben, ihren Arbeitseinsatz zu ändern. Diese Studie zeigt, dass Arbeitskräfte einen grosszügigen Lohn mit
höherer Arbeitsleistung erwidern. Dies gilt besonders für diejenigen, die Fairness als wichtig empfinden
und sich vor der Lohnerhöhung unterbezahlt fühlten. Das zweite Experiment untersucht die Wirkung
einer Lohnkürzung auf die Arbeitsleistung, wenn entweder das ganze Team oder nur einen Teil davon
betroffen ist. Diese Studie zeigt auf, dass eine generelle Lohnkürzung die Arbeitsleistung senkt, wohinge-
gen eine Lohnkürzung nur für einzelne Arbeitskräfte deren Leistung um mehr als das Doppelte reduziert.
Diese Erkenntnis unterstreicht die Bedeutung von sozialen Motiven und die Notwendigkeit einer Verän-
derung des Menschenbilds in der Ökonomie. In Kapitel 4 erforsche ich den gemeinsamen Einfluss von
materiellen Anreizen und sozialer Interaktion auf die Arbeitsleistung. Viele Firmen bieten Lohnsysteme
an, bei welchen die eigene Leistung vor‐ oder nachteilhafte Nebeneffekte auf das Einkommen der Arbeit-
skollegen hat. Soziale Interaktion am Arbeitsplatz kann dabei die Anreize dieser Lohnsysteme verzerren.
Diese Studie findet heraus, dass bei Entlohnung der Arbeitskräfte durch Turnieranreize, d.h. wenn die
eigene Leistung sich nachteilhaft auf das Einkommen der Arbeitskollegen auswirkt, soziale Interaktion
die Anreize ausser Kraft setzt und zu geheimen Absprachen führt. Wenn hingegen Arbeitskräfte sehr
unterschiedliche Fähigkeiten besitzen, dann sind geheime Absprachen schwieriger aufrecht zu halten.
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Introduction
Economics was long considered a non-experimental science that mainly relied on the
correlational analysis of real-world economies. Only twenty-five years ago, Samuelson and
Nordhaus (1985) claimed that:
One possible way of figuring out economic laws [. . .] is by controlled exper-
iments. [. . .] Economists (unfortunately) [. . .] cannot perform the controlled
experiments of chemists or biologists because they cannot easily control other
important factors. Like astronomers or meteorologists, they generally must
be content largely to observe.
In the last two decades, however, the use of experimental methods in economics has
grown steadily and radically challenged this view. The conferral of the 2002 Nobel Prize
on Vernon Smith and the growing number of publications in top journals demonstrate the
increasing importance of experimental economics.
Most economic experiments are computerized laboratory experiments. In the lab, the
experimenter knows and controls every aspect of the decision environment. This tight
control provides the experimenter with the possibility of easily implementing exogenous
and randomized variations in environmental factors. Controlled variation of conditions
allows for causal inference, which is essential for testing economic theories. A key question,
however, is whether empirical results from laboratory experiments can be generalized to
the field (Levitt and List, 2007; Falk and Heckman, 2009). Skeptics of lab experiments
criticize the stylized decision environments and the fact that subjects know they are
participating in an experiment.
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In response to these criticisms, field experiments became quite popular as a bridge
between laboratory and naturally-occurring field data.1 The major advantage of field
experiments derives from the possibility of observing subjects in a more natural, but still
controlled environment. The purpose of an experiment determines whether enhanced
realism is important. If the purpose extends beyond testing economic theories, field ex-
periments clearly allow for a better understanding of the reality and thus have greater
relevance to policy. Another advantage of field experiments is that subjects are unaware
they are participants in an experiment and consequently do not know that the experi-
menter is observing their behavior. The subjects may still perceive that others observe
them, but they cannot deliberately behave in a manner that the experimenter will view
favorably. This feature prevents experimenter demand effects; these may confound the
empirical results (Zizzo, forthcoming).
Field experiments, however, also entail several disadvantages when compared to lab-
oratory experiments. The main disadvantage is that field experiments do not allow for
the same degree of control over the environment as do lab experiments. This sometimes
makes it difficult to distinguish between alternative theories. Another disadvantage of
field experiments is the difficulty in replicating the empirical results with the collection
of new data from a comparable environment. This difficulty arises because many field
experiments require the cooperation of outside entities, such as firm or government repre-
sentatives. Precise replication, however, is of great importance because it not only tests
whether the results can be verified independently, but it also provides the experimenter
with incentives to collect data carefully. The advantages and disadvantages of field com-
pared to laboratory experiments underscore the complementarity of these methods in
improving the state of knowledge in economics.
This thesis demonstrates with three examples of how field experiments can be im-
plemented in the context of labor economics. Chapter 2 presents evidence from a field
experiment that examines whether workers reciprocate wage increases with higher effort
and the extent to which their response is related to their fairness perceptions and prefer-
ences. Economists traditionally assume that workers only respond to economic incentives.
1The word “field” in field experiments was coined in the pioneering experiments of Fisher (1926)
who examined the impact of field conditions on agricultural yields. The first wave of economic field
experiments started with the Hawthorne experiments in the 1920s. Their objective was to test whether
better lightning conditions increase worker productivity (Mayo, 1933; Roethlisberger et al., 1939). Ross
initiated the second wave in the 1960s, when she conducted a large-scale social experiment to explore the
effects of negative income taxes on various outcomes, such as labor supply and consumption (Greenberg
and Shroder, 2004).
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However, some economists have long recognized that, in addition to economic incentives,
workers are also strongly motivated by fairness concerns (Slichter, 1920; Marshall, 1925;
Hicks, 1932). A prominent example is the fair wage-effort model by Akerlof and Yellen
(1990). According to this hypothesis, workers feel entitled to a fair wage. The model as-
sumes that if the actual wage is less than the fair wage, workers perceive higher wages as
fairer and will consequently exert more effort. Extensive evidence from laboratory exper-
iments supports a positive relationship between wages and effort. However, evidence that
higher wages are perceived as fairer and consequently elicit higher effort in real-life work
environments is less clear-cut. In our field experiment, we implemented wages increases
and measured the associated changes in work performance. We later conducted a follow-
up survey among the workers where we both determined the wage workers thought would
be appropriate for their work and experimentally elicited their inclination for reciprocal
fairness.
While Chapter 2 focuses on the positive relationship between wages and effort, Chapter
3 explores the determinants of the fair wage. This chapter describes the empirical results
of a field experiment that tests whether workers reciprocate wage cuts with lower effort and
the extent to which their response is influenced by the wages their coworkers earn. These
questions are difficult to answer without experimental data because wage cuts, especially
those aimed only at part of the workforce, are rarely observed in the field. According
to Bewley (1999), firms often seem reluctant to cut wages because of the fear that wage
cuts may inhibit work performance. Nevertheless, if wages are actually downwardly rigid,
this has important implications for the functioning of labor markets, such as involuntary
unemployment or wage compression. In our field experiment, we allocated workers in
teams of two and exposed either one or both team members to a wage cut.
Chapter 4 comprises the findings of a field experiment that tests the effects of social
interaction on work performance in the presence of either positive or negative effort ex-
ternalities. Many jobs involve effort externalities that create inefficiencies for the workers
if they fail to internalize them. Substantial evidence from laboratory experiments shows
that communication increases cooperation when positive externalities are in place. How-
ever, the role of social interaction in facilitating the internalization of both positive and
negative externalities, as well as the limitations of this role remains poorly understood.
In our field experiment, workers were invited in groups of four and they were randomly
divided in teams of two. Team members either worked in the same or in a different of-
fice. Social interaction between team members was thus only possible when assigned to a
3
shared office. In addition, workers faced either team or relative incentives. Consequently,
effort either imposed a positive or a negative externality on the team member’s income.
The results of this field experiment underscore the relevance of office arrangements for
the design of optimal incentive schemes.
Overall, the findings presented in this thesis substantiate the value of field experiments
as a method to enhance our understanding of labor markets.
4
Chapter 1
Fair Wages and Effort
Chapter Summary
We conducted a field experiment to test whether wage increases induce workers to pro-
vide more work effort voluntarily. The experiment took place when a publisher hired
workers to distribute a newly launched free newspaper at train stations and other public
places. Workers were paid a flat wage and knew they did not have the prospect of long-
term employment. Consequently, they had no economic incentives to exert more than
minimal effort. We implemented wage increases and measured the associated changes
in work performance. We also conducted a follow-up survey among the workers where
we measured the wage workers thought would be appropriate for their work as well as
workers’ propensity for reciprocal fairness. We show that a higher wage significantly in-
creased work performance. Further analysis shows that only workers who both considered
the base wage to be unfairly low and who revealed fairness preferences drove this effect.
This evidence strongly corroborates the fair-wage effort hypothesis, which has sweeping
implications for the functioning of labor markets.
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1.1 Introduction
Do fairness concerns drive worker behavior? There is a growing theoretical literature that
stresses the importance of fairness and its far-reaching implications in the labor market.1
A prominent example is the fair wage-effort hypothesis by Akerlof and Yellen (1990).2
The model assumes that workers feel entitled to a fair wage. Accordingly, wage increases
up to the fair wage lead to higher work effort. In contrast, pay raises above the fair wage
do not affect effort. The basic idea of this model is that only wage increases that improve
the perceived fairness of the wage are associated with higher effort (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis
-
6
wf
e¯
e
w
The figure shows the behavioral assumption of the fair wage-effort hypothesis
that can explain the existence of involuntary unemployment. If e denotes effort
supplied, e¯ is the upper bound of effort, w is the actual wage, and wf is the
fair wage, the fair wage-effort hypothesis says that e = e¯ ·min[ w
wf
, 1].
Extensive evidence from laboratory experiments and from manager interviews strongly
supports the notion that higher wages induce workers to provide more effort.3 Neverthe-
less, experimental evidence in real-life jobs is less clear-cut and the effects found are
1For empirical evidence of potential economic implications, see Dickens and Katz (1987) on inter-
industry wage differentials, Clark and Oswald (1994) on involuntary unemployment, and Bewley (1999)
on downward wage rigidity.
2For a more recent formalization of a very similar idea, see Benjamin (2006), Danthine and Kurmann
(2008), and Cabrales et al. (2008).
3See Fehr et al. (1993), Fehr and Falk (1999), Hannan et al. (2002), Brandts et al. (2004), Charness
et al. (2004) and Charness (2004) for lab evidence from gift exchange experiments. Kaufman (1984),
Doeringer et al. (1971), Blinder and Choi (1990), Agell and Lundborg (1995), Bewley (1995), Levine
(1993) and Campbell III and Kamlani (1997) stress the importance of fairness in determination of pay
as described in manager interviews.
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usually very small. In a recent study, Gneezy and List (2006) find a positive effect of a
wage increase on work performance. However, the effect is temporary and dissipates after
three hours.4 Kube et al. (2010a), who use a design similar to that of Gneezy and List
(2006), find no significant impact of a wage increase on work performance. Al-Ubaydli
et al. (2008) use a setting where workers were concerned with their reputation. They
find a positive and significant performance difference between workers who were paid a
high wage and those paid a low wage. Most recently, Kube et al. (2010b) find a very
large and significant effect of a non-monetary gift on work performance. These conflicting
results are sometimes taken as evidence that results from laboratory experiments do not
generalize to the field (Levitt and List, 2007).
This chapter reports evidence from a field experiment that explores whether higher
wages motivate workers to provide more work effort voluntarily. We also present evidence
showing that workers’ response to higher wages depends on the level of their fair wage
as well as their propensity for reciprocal fairness. Our field experiment took place during
a newspaper promotion, where a publisher hired workers from a promotion agency. It
was clear from the outset that the newspaper promotion would only last a few weeks.
Workers therefore had no prospect of long-term employment, thus ruling out reputation
incentives.5 Workers’ task was to distribute copies of a newly launched newspaper at
train stations and other public places. The promotion agency paid the workers an hourly
wage of CHF 22.6 In collaboration with the publisher, we raised workers’ hourly wage by
CHF 5 in a randomized and controlled way. Ten weeks after the newspaper promotion,
we conducted a follow-up survey among the workers that was seemingly unrelated to the
promotion. The survey asked questions concerning part-time work. Most importantly,
the survey prompted the workers to indicate the wage they considered to be fair for their
work. The survey concluded with a social dilemma experiment providing us a measure of
workers’ fairness preferences.
This setup improves on earlier studies in several ways. Earlier studies provided the
4In a pioneering field experiment, Pritchard et al. (1972) manipulate workers’ perception of the fairness
of their pay, while paying them all the same wage. However, they find no significant performance difference
between workers who were made to believe that their pay was generous and those who were made to
believe that their pay was unfairly low.
5Alternative efficiency wage models can also explain a positive relationship between wages and effort
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bull, 1987; Hart and Holmstro¨m, 1987; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989). In
contrast to the fair wage-effort hypothesis, these models assume an infinite employment duration where
workers care about their reputation. A setting where reputation incentives are absent is crucial for
distinguishing between the fair wage-effort hypothesis and the other models.
6CHF 1 corresponds to $0.96 (situation January 2010).
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important first step of randomizing wages in a real-life work environment (Gneezy and
List, 2006; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2008; Kube et al., 2010a,b). As mentioned earlier, a common
finding in these studies is that raising wages above the baseline level has only a small and
insignificant effect on work performance. These studies, however, are limited by their
very small sample sizes which involved a maximum of 30 subjects, and in most cases 10
or less per treatment. Moreover, subjects were typically observed once over a period of
six hours. Because of the low number of observations, statistical power is low, making
it hard to reject the null hypothesis of no effect.7 We, in contrast, observed 196 workers
who were on the job for an average of seven three-hour shifts. This allows us to test the
fair wage-effort hypothesis with greater statistical power. As in earlier studies, we only
find a small effect of raising the wage on work performance. Because of the larger number
of observations in our study, however, we can reject the null hypothesis of no effect.
It may be wrong to conclude from these results, however, that fairness concerns are
irrelevant for worker behavior. All of the previous studies offered a comparatively high
base wage, making it difficult to improve the perceived fairness of the wage. Since the
fair wage-effort model assumes that workers are only likely to work more if they currently
feel underpaid, these fairness perceptions need to be measured. Moreover, in contrast
to laboratory experiments, where the researcher can control all environmental factors,
workers’ conception of a fair wage in the field is less clear and may strongly differ between
individuals. Thus, we measured workers’ fair wage, allowing us to go beyond studying the
overall effect of a wage increase on work performance. We indeed find strong heterogeneity
in fairness perceptions. In our study, about half of the workers considered the base wage
to be inadequately low, while the other half considered the base pay appropriate. When
we relate workers’ response to their fairness perceptions, we find that wage increases up
to the fair wage had a large impact on work performance, while pay raises above the fair
wage had no effect on work performance, as postulated by the theory. These findings
explain why the overall effect in our study, and possibly in others as well, is rather small.
Evidence from laboratory experiments also shows that some individuals have strictly
selfish preferences and do not react to higher wages, or even to fairness manipulations.
Our measure of workers’ preferences allows us to classify them as reciprocal and non-
reciprocal. We show that only reciprocal workers exerted more work when the wage was
raised towards what they thought was fair. Conversely, non-reciprocal workers did not at
all react to wage increases, even when they considered the base wage to be unfairly low.
7This problem is exacerbated by the absence of a within-subjects design.
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Overall, our results strongly support the fair wage-effort hypothesis and provide an
explanation for the seemingly incompatible findings in laboratory and field experiments.
1.2 Economic Environment
A major publisher launched a free daily newspaper in May 2006, and hired a promotion
agency in order to publicize the newspaper.
1.2.1 Promotion Agency
The core business of the promotion agency is the organization of sales promotions. It
retains a large pool of part-time employees it can contact when the specific need arises.
Workers can typically sign up for work shifts two weeks prior to a shift. When workers
agree to take on at least some shifts, they receive information about the required attire,
hours of work, and hourly wage. Workers’ task usually consists of distributing samples.
1.2.2 Newspaper Promotion
The promotion agency assigned workers to train stations and other public places and
asked them to distribute copies of the newly launched newspaper to passers-by. Before
starting work, workers met a supervisor who informed them about the assigned location.8
Workers were reminded to approach potential readers actively and also to retain the
plastic straps from the newspaper bundles that were fully distributed in order to have an
accurate count of the number of copies dispersed.9 Workers then went to their assigned
locations to distribute copies during three hours. At the end of a shift, workers returned
to their supervisor to return the straps from the distributed newspaper bundles and to
check out.10
It is noteworthy that several aspects of this work environment did not encourage the
workers to exert high effort. First, workers earned a flat wage rather than a piece rate,
8Supervisors were full-time employees of the promotion agency and responsible for five to ten work-
ers. Their task was to ensure that workers had a sufficient number of copies to distribute at all times.
Supervisors were also instructed to make sure that no workers simply threw the newspaper away; the
promotion agency has the policy of firing workers if they do so. No such incident was reported.
9Workers were also asked to keep an accurate count of the number of copies distributed from the last,
partially distributed bundle.
10After a shift, supervisors went back to the locations to record the remaining number of copies and
put them into the newspaper boxes. This procedure allowed us to verify the number of distributed copies
at the worker level.
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which meant that pay was independent of the number of copies distributed. Second,
nobody could blame the workers if the newspaper demand was low and therefore the
amount of copies distributed was low too. Third, the locations provided the workers with
an attractive opportunity to shirk because they could easily hold private conversations
in an unobtrusive way. Finally, the agency had a difficult time covering all locations due
to the sheer size of the newspaper promotion. Consequently, about twenty percent of
the planned work shifts could not be filled with workers, which meant that the locations
remained unallocated on some days (see Figure 1.2). In summary, the threat of firing
workers due to too little effort was not credible during the newspaper promotion.
Figure 1.2: Fraction of Unallocated Locations
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1.3 Study
The study consists of two phases. First, we conducted a field experiment to analyze the
impact of wage increases on work performance. Second, we conducted a follow-up survey
to examine whether workers’ response to the wage increases is related to their fairness
perceptions and preferences.
1.3.1 Field Experiment
Our field experiment took place in the city of Zurich, Switzerland, and was conducted
over a four-week period in June and July 2006. The promotion agency divided the city
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into two equally-sized regions, based on the organizational structure of the newspaper
promotion. Each region had its own manager who was in charge of the recruitment and
assignment of workers and supervisors to the locations. Importantly, workers in one region
were sometimes assigned to different locations in that region, but they were never assigned
to work in the other region.
In the baseline treatment, workers were paid the hourly base wage of CHF 22, which we
will refer to as “CHF22” condition. In the main treatment, the publisher raised workers’
hourly wage by CHF 5, from CHF 22 to CHF 27. In the following, we will refer to this
condition as “CHF27”. Pay raises were implemented just before the beginning of a work
shift. The publisher sent two announcements of the change: workers received a postcard as
well as a text message on their mobile phones.11 Together with the pay raise information,
both the postcard and text message reminded the workers that it was important to retain
the straps from the distributed newspaper bundles. In order to keep the treatment of
workers constant, workers in the baseline treatment also received a postcard and a text
message reminding them of the importance of keeping the straps from the distributed
newspaper bundles.
Figure 1.3 presents the timing and change in treatments. In each of the four weeks,
workers in one region were randomly assigned to treatment CHF27, while those of the
other region served as a control and were assigned to treatment CHF22. There were two
reasons for choosing a weekly rotation of the treatments. First, a weekly rotation, com-
pared to a less frequent rotation, allows for a more robust identification of confounding
time effects, which may have been large in view of the newspaper launching. Second,
there was a strongly anticipated turnover after the second week of the experiment. Thus,
a weekly rotation helped generate within-subjects variations in pay, enabling us to control
for worker heterogeneity in the empirical analysis. A more frequent rotation, however,
could have confused the supervisors who were in charge of distributing the correct post-
cards. Although treatment assignment changed every week, treatments were implemented
on a day-to-day basis because workers could freely choose how many shifts they worked
and they typically worked on an irregular basis. If asked, workers were told that the
publisher decided when and where the high wage was payable, and that the promotion
agency did not know this information in advance. This was done to rule out selection
11The postcard bore the publisher’s logo and both the postcard and text message concluded with the
name of the publisher. This was done in order to make it plain that the publisher, and not the promotion
agency, was paying workers the wage supplement.
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into work shifts where workers assumed that the high wage would be paid. Importantly,
neither workers nor supervisors knew they were participating in an experiment.
Figure 1.3: Timing of Events
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The figure visualizes the two phases of the study. First, workers of one region
were randomly assigned to receive the high wage (treatment CHF27), while
those of the other region received the base wage (treatment CHF22). Second,
workers were asked to complete a survey on part-time work that included a
social dilemma experiment.
Towards the end of the field experiment, the promotion agency sent a feedback form
to the workers. Workers were asked questions concerning their work environment. In
particular, the feedback form asked the workers to rate the fairness of the base and high
wage on a five-point scale: “I consider the hourly base wage of CHF 22 for the exertion of
this task to be [from stingy to generous ]” and “I consider the hourly high wage of CHF 27
for the exertion of this task to be [from stingy to generous ]”. This serves as a manipulation
check. In order to prevent confounding demand effects, workers were assured that their
responses were anonymous.
1.3.2 Follow-Up Survey
In October 2006, we conducted a follow-up survey among the workers. The survey was
mailed from the University of Zurich and informed the recipients that some firms had been
asked to provide addresses from their part-time employees. The workers in the newspaper
promotion had no indication that this survey was in any way connected to the variation
in pay they had experienced earlier.
The survey asked a variety of questions related to part-time work and also collected
demographic information. The recipients were asked to indicate up to three employers
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from the previous six months, and they had to answer questions relating to each of their
listed employers.12 The questions of key interest to us were “How much (gross CHF per
hour) did you earn at employer [employer name]?” and “How much (gross CHF per hour)
do you think is appropriate for the exertion of this task at employer [employer name]?”.
These two questions allow us to identify workers’ fairness perceptions and to relate them
to their response to the wage increases.
At the end of the survey, workers were asked to participate in a paper and pencil
experiment. The experiment was a one-shot, sequential social dilemma game with two
players who were anonymously matched with a part-time employee from a different firm.
Workers from the newspaper promotion were assigned to be second movers, and their
decisions were elicited using the strategy method. The first movers had three options:
they could keep CHF 6 for themselves and give CHF 18 to the second mover, keep CHF
12 and give CHF 12, or keep CHF 18 and give CHF 6. A second mover could reward
or punish the first mover by assigning positive or negative points, respectively. Second
movers could also decide not to assign any points at all. The reward and punishment
technology was designed in such a way that one positive (negative) point cost the second
mover CHF 1 and increased (decreased) the first mover’s payoff by CHF 3. Second movers
could assign up to two positive or negative points, respectively, per allocation. We use
second mover decisions to classify the workers from the newspaper promotion as reciprocal
or non-reciprocal. Second movers are classified as a reciprocal type if they assigned more
positive points in (6,18) than in (12,12) or more positive points in (12,12) than in (18,6).
Thus, in order to be counted as reciprocal type, second movers had to reward first movers
for giving them a better allocation.
If the respondents fully completed and returned the survey within two weeks, they
received a guaranteed amount of CHF 7 for completing the survey plus the amount earned
in the social dilemma game.
1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 provides basic descriptive statistics of the experimental set-up. Workers, on
average, handed out 230 copies per hour and worked 6.5 shifts over the four-week period
of the field experiment. Of the 196 workers who participated in the field experiment, 113
12The six months covered the time period of the newspaper promotion.
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workers answered the feedback form and 119 workers completed the follow-up survey.13
Workers were relatively young (22 years) and mostly female (73 percent). Half of them
were enrolled or already graduated from university (23 percent), respectively college (24
percent).
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Newspaper Promotion
Hourly copies distributed 229.777 84.409 16.667 578.212 1269
# Work shifts 6.474 4.248 1 19 196
Feedback Form
Fairness rating of high wage 2.858 0.844 1 5 113
Fairness rating of base wage 3.894 0.910 2 5 113
Follow-Up Survey
Fair wage – base wage (in CHF/h) 1.097 2.056 –4 8 119
Age 22.465 4.698 16 42 114
Male 0.272 0.447 0 1 114
Foreigner 0.132 0.340 0 1 114
# Siblings 1.439 0.912 0 5 114
Secondary education 0.614 0.489 0 1 114
Apprenticeship 0.281 0.451 0 1 114
Continuing education 0.211 0.409 0 1 114
High school 0.675 0.470 0 1 114
College 0.237 0.427 0 1 114
University 0.228 0.421 0 1 114
Points if (6, 18) 0.890 0.885 –2 2 118
Points if (12, 12) 0.254 0.730 –2 2 118
Points if (18, 6) –0.559 1.050 –2 2 118
The table describes the data used in this study. Data come from three types of sources: the newspaper
promotion, covering the number of copies distributed per actual working hour and the number of work
shifts taken, the feedback form, containing anonymous fairness judgments of the two wage levels, and the
follow-up survey, which allows to track individual fairness perceptions, characteristics and preferences.
13Five survey participants did not answer the questions on personal characteristics and one worker did
not participate in the social dilemma experiment.
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1.3.4 Randomization Check
We now test whether individual characteristics were balanced across treatments using
data from the follow-up survey. Table 1.2 reports the means and standard deviations
of these characteristics for each treatment. The last column of this table presents the
results of a non-parametric test for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization. It is
clear that we cannot reject the null of no difference between treatments for any of the
characteristics.14
Table 1.2: Randomization Check
Treatment
Data CHF22 CHF27
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value
Follow-Up Survey
Fair wage – base wage 1.088 (2.099) 1.081 (2.142) 0.694
Age 23.370 (5.257) 23.344 (5.397) 0.770
Male 0.281 (0.450) 0.267 (0.443) 0.681
Foreigner 0.161 (0.368) 0.172 (0.378) 0.697
# Siblings 1.376 (0.849) 1.367 (0.854) 0.912
Secondary education 0.648 (0.478) 0.633 (0.483) 0.692
Apprenticeship 0.331 (0.471) 0.308 (0.462) 0.516
Continuing education 0.248 (0.432) 0.242 (0.429) 0.852
High school 0.618 (0.487) 0.658 (0.475) 0.268
College 0.251 (0.434) 0.211 (0.409) 0.215
University 0.245 (0.431) 0.211 (0.409) 0.290
Points if (6, 18) 0.811 (0.902) 0.857 0.891 0.461
Points if (12, 12) 0.251 (0.726) 0.248 (0.684) 0.878
Points if (18, 6) –0.651 (1.017) –0.663 (1.004) 0.976
Treatment averages (and standard deviations in parentheses) are reported in the first four columns. The
last column contains p-values (χ2 tests for binary and Mann-Whitney tests for non-binary variables) for
the null hypothesis of perfect randomization.
14Notice that the p-values for the tests are calculated assuming independence between all observations.
Because we have repeated observations from individuals, this likely understates the variance in the data.
Thus, if anything, these tests are biased toward finding a difference. Nevertheless, the lowest p-value we
find is 0.215.
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1.3.5 Check for Selection Bias
As the recruitment and assignment to locations was done approximately two weeks prior to
a work shift, workers should not have been able to select into treatment CHF27. However,
we examine this in two ways. First, we run the following regression
sic = αi + I(CHF27)ic + ǫic, (1.1)
where the dependent variable sic is the number of shifts that worker i worked in treatment
c. We include a fixed effect αi for each worker and a treatment indicator for CHF27.
Finally, ǫic is the idiosyncratic error term, which we allow to be correlated within workers.
Second, we run another regression to check whether the fraction of unallocated work
shifts differed by treatments. That is, we run the regression
utc = δt + I(CHF27)tc + ǫic, (1.2)
where the dependent variable utc is the ratio of unallocated shifts per day t and treatment
c. We include day fixed effects δt in the estimation and allow the error term ǫic to be
correlated within days.
Column (1) of Table 1.3 shows the estimation results of equation (1.1). Workers, on
average, worked 3.14 shifts in treatment CHF22, and 3.32 shifts in treatment CHF27
respectively. This difference is small and insignificant. Column (2) reveals the estimation
results of equation (1.2). Again, the indicator for treatment CHF27 is close to zero and
insignificant. Taken together, we find no indication that workers were able to select into
the high-wage treatment.
1.4 Results
This section reports the results from our study presented in four steps. First, we reveal
whether workers considered the base wage to be fair for this job. We also test whether
the higher wage improved the perceived fairness of the wage. Second, we analyze whether
workers reciprocated the higher wage with higher work performance. Third, we examine
whether workers’ response to wage increases was related to their fairness perceptions.
Finally, we explore whether workers’ preferences affected their response to the wage in-
creases.
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Table 1.3: Check for Selection Bias
Dependent variables: (1) (2)
(1) # shifts, (2) fraction of unallocated shifts
CHF27 (=1) 0.189 0.008
(0.184) (0.028)
Constant 3.143*** 0.193***
(0.092) (0.014)
Individual fixed effects Yes No
Day fixed effects No Yes
N 392 40
R2 0.846 0.519
OLS estimates. The unit of observation in column (1) is worker i in treatment c, and the dependent
variable is the number of shifts per treatment. The unit of observation in column (2) is day t in treatment
c, and the dependent variable is the fraction of unfilled shifts. Fixed effects are normalized such that the
constant reflects the mean of the omitted category. Standard errors, clustered by workers, respectively
days, in parentheses. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1.4.1 Fairness Perceptions of the Wage
There is substantial heterogeneity in workers’ fairness perceptions, as shown in Figure
1.4. Based on data from the follow-up survey, the figure displays the difference between
the wage workers considered to be fair, and that they were effectively paid in the baseline
treatment. Thus, a positive number indicates that workers felt underpaid, while a negative
number indicates that they felt overpaid. The figure shows that 53 percent considered the
base wage to be inadequately low. Thus, a large number of workers accepted the job even
though they thought that the base wage was unfairly low. Of the remaining 47 percent,
35 percent perceived the base wage as adequate, while very few (12 percent) stated that
they were paid more in the baseline treatment than they thought was adequate for this
job.
Figure 1.4 suggests that an improvement in the perceived fairness of the wage was
possible for a slight majority of workers. Using data from the anonymous feedback form,
we indeed find strong evidence that the high wage significantly improved the perceived
fairness of the wage, as Figure 1.5 indicates. The figure shows that 30 percent rated the
base wage in the two lowest fairness categories, while only 2 percent reported the same for
the high wage. Thus, there is a clear shift to a fairer evaluation of pay. In particular, the
strongest shift in the distribution of fairness judgments seems to come from the bottom
17
Figure 1.4: Fairness Perceptions of the Base Wage
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The figure plots the difference between the wage workers considered to be fair
for this job and the base wage (treatment CHF22).
end of the distribution. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test clearly rejects the null hypothesis
that both distributions are the same (p < 0.001). This result confirms that we effectively
manipulated the perceived fairness of the wage for a significant fraction of workers.
Figure 1.5: Fairness Evaluation of the Base Wage and High Wage
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The figure compares anonymous fairness judgments of the base wage (treatment
CHF22) and high wage (treatment CHF27).
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1.4.2 Impact of Wage Increases on Work Performance
Figure 1.6 presents the overall effect of the wage increases on work performance for both
the full sample and for those workers who also participated in the survey. Work perfor-
mance is measured as the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed. Because
locations were vacant on some days (see Figure 1.2), the figures in this chapter display
work performance as the percentage change in performance compared to the average per-
formance in a certain location. Thus, a zero corresponds to an average work performance,
while a positive number indicates greater-than-average performance. We find a rather
small overall effect of the wage increases on work performance for both samples. As evi-
dent from Figure 1.6, raising the wage by 23 percent increased work performance by about
0.04 log points, or approximately 4 percent.
Figure 1.6: Impact of Wage Increases on Work Performance
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The figure presents average work performance per treatment, shown separately
for the full and survey sample. Work performance is normalized as the percent-
age change in the number of hourly copies distributed compared to the average
in a certain location.
To examine this effect more formally, we estimate the following equation
log(yit) = γ0 log(wit) + ψj(it) + δt + ǫit, (1.3)
where log(yit) denotes the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed by worker
i on day t, log(wit) is the logarithm of the hourly wage, which was either CHF 22 or
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CHF 27, depending on the treatment. We include location fixed effects ψj to control for
performance differences between locations, and day fixed effects δt to control for differences
between days. Finally, ǫit is the idiosyncratic error term, which we allow to be correlated
within workers. We also run a more conservative specification in which we additionally
include worker fixed effects, denoted by αi, to control for differences between workers.
The regression equation is then given by
log(yit) = γ0 log(wit) + αi + ψj(it) + δt + ǫit. (1.4)
We estimate equations (1.3) and (1.4) using OLS, and adjust the standard errors for
clustering on workers. The results are displayed in Table 1.4, and the estimated coefficients
can be interpreted directly as elasticities. Depending on the sample and specification of
the regression model, the point estimate of the treatment effect varies between 0.175 and
0.134. This implies that doubling the wage would have led to a performance increase
between 17.5 and 13.4 percent. Our point estimate is small, but it is solidly within the
confidence intervals of earlier field studies. Unlike the earlier studies, however, the large
number of observations in our study provides enough precision to reject the null hypothesis
of no effect.
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Table 1.4: Impact of Wage Increases on Work Performance
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(hourly copies distributed)
Log(wit) 0.175** 0.134* 0.175* 0.110
(0.078) (0.078) (0.100) (0.105)
Constant 4.786*** 5.139*** 4.770*** 5.248***
(0.251) (0.271) (0.315) (0.333)
Individual fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Survey Survey
N 1269 1269 722 722
R2 0.597 0.716 0.590 0.716
Prob> χ2, F 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
OLS estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on workers, are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed. The independent variable log(wit) is
the logarithm of the hourly wage. Fixed effects are normalized such that the constant reflects the mean
of the omitted category. The sample “Full” involves all workers of the field experiment, while the sample
“Survey” includes only the workers who also participated in the follow-up survey. Level of significance:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1.4.3 Fairness Perceptions and the Response to Wage Increases
Average results may be misleading for the assessment of the role of fairness concerns
because we find substantial heterogeneity in fairness perceptions. As already mentioned,
about half of the workers considered the base wage to be unfairly low, while the other
half perceived it to be fair. We thus examine the impact of the wage increases separately
for workers who considered the base wage to be adequate and those who considered it
to be inadequately low. As can be seen in Figure 1.7, raising the wage of workers who
were already adequately paid had no impact on work performance. Conversely, raising
pay of underpaid workers clearly increased work performance. In this case, the standard
error bands of the treatment averages do not overlap, indicating a significant difference
between treatment CHF22 and CHF27.
These standard errors are, however, calculated under the assumption that each ob-
servation is an independent draw. Since we have multiple observations per worker, these
standard errors may be too small. To address this problem, as well as to include tighter
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Figure 1.7: Fairness Perceptions and the Response to Wage Increases
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The figure illustrates average work performance per treatment, shown sepa-
rately for workers who initially felt adequately paid and those who felt under-
paid. Work performance is normalized as the percentage change in the number
of hourly copies distributed compared to the average in a certain location.
controls, we estimate the following regression
log(yit) = γ0 log(wit) + γ1∆i + γ2 log(wit)×∆i + ψj(it) + δt + ǫit, (1.5)
where the variable ∆i is the difference between the wage workers considered to be fair
for this work and the base wage. Thus, positive numbers mean that workers considered
the base wage to be unfairly low, a value of zero means that the base wage corresponded
exactly to the fair wage, and negative numbers imply that workers considered the base
wage to be more than fair (though this hardly ever occurred, as Figure 1.4 indicates).
We re-estimate this model, but include worker fixed effects. This specification has the
advantage that it does not require ∆i to enter equation (1.5) linearly, but allows for any
relationship between individual characteristics, including fairness perceptions, and work
performance. The regression equation is then given by
log(yit) = γ0 log(wit) + γ2 log(wit)×∆i + αi + ψj(it) + δt + ǫit. (1.6)
The estimates for equations (1.5) and (1.6) are shown in Table 1.5 and confirm the visual
impression from Figure 1.7. As shown in Column (1), the coefficient of log(wit) is not
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significantly different from zero. Because of the interaction with ∆i, this coefficient repre-
sents the impact of a wage increase on work performance when ∆i is zero, i.e., when the
base wage was considered to be appropriate. Since we specify both sides of the equation
(1.5) in logs, the coefficient of log(wit) can be interpreted directly as an elasticity. Its
point estimate is 0.07, and thus, very low. This implies that doubling the wage would
have led to 7 percent higher work performance. The 90 percent confidence interval ends
at 25 percent, which is still very small. Raising the wage thus had no significant impact
on work performance for workers who considered the base wage to be adequate.
In contrast, we find a significant effect from raising pay for workers who considered
the base wage to be unfairly low. The coefficient of the interaction between log(wit) and
∆i is significantly different from zero, implying that underpaid workers responded to the
wage increases in a significantly different way than workers who thought that the base
wage was fair. The point estimate of this interaction term implies that for every CHF
that a worker felt underpaid, the elasticity of work performance with respect to pay rises
by 0.093. In other words, for a worker who thought that the hourly fair wage was CHF
27, the elasticity is 0.07 + 5·0.093 = 0.54.
We obtain the same result for the fixed effect specification, as shown in Column (2).
There is virtually no response from workers who felt paid adequately in the baseline treat-
ment, but a substantial response from workers who felt underpaid. Thus, heterogeneity
in fairness perceptions led to a different response to the wage increases.
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Table 1.5: Fairness Perceptions and the Response to Wage Increases
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
Log(hourly copies distributed)
Log(wit) 0.067 0.010
(0.108) (0.109)
∆i –0.281*** –
(0.104)
Log(wit)×∆i 0.093*** 0.091**
(0.033) (0.040)
Constant 5.107*** 5.249***
(0.347) (0.326)
Individual fixed effects No Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes
Day fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Survey Survey
N 722 722
R2 0.599 0.718
Prob> χ2, F 0.000 0.000
OLS estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on workers, are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed. The independent variable log(wit) is
the logarithm of the hourly wage. Fixed effects are normalized such that the constant reflects the mean
of the omitted category. ∆i is the difference between the wage a worker considered to be fair and the
base wage (treatment CHF22). The sample is restricted to the workers who participated in the follow-up
survey. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1.4.4 Robustness Checks
We now turn to some robustness checks. First, we test whether this interaction effect
is not due to other variables that may happen to be correlated with workers’ fairness
perceptions. Using data from the follow-up survey, we do not find strong predictors of
fairness perceptions. We thus look at ability, as one may assume that high-ability workers
are more likely to feel underpaid than low-ability workers. As a result, fairness perceptions
could simply reflect worker ability, which in turn could have affected the response to the
wage increases.
We interpret worker fixed effects αi from equation (1.4) as a measure of worker
ability. Workers with a high αi were, on average, more productive than workers with a
low αi. Thus, we divide workers into two groups: workers with an αi above the median
(high-ability), and those with an αi below the median (low-ability). We re-estimate
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equations (1.3) to (1.6), yet include a dummy for high-ability and interact this dummy
with log(wit). The results are displayed in Table 1.6 and provide no evidence of such
an alternative explanation. Including a dummy for high-ability does not change the
conclusions, and the dummy does not interact with workers’ response to the wage
increases.
Table 1.6: Robustness Check for Ability
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(hourly copies distributed)
Log(wit) 0.147 0.074 0.062 0.009
(0.169) (0.190) (0.170) (0.184)
∆i –0.291*** –
(0.105)
Log(wit) ×∆i 0.094*** 0.091**
(0.033) (0.041)
High-ability (=1) 0.139 – 0.288 –
(0.739) (0.738)
Log(wit) × high-ability (=1) 0.035 0.068 –0.013 0.001
(0.230) (0.251) (0.230) (0.252)
Constant 4.716*** 5.243*** 4.987*** 5.249***
(0.537) (0.330) (0.540) (0.323)
Individual fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Survey Survey Survey Survey
N 722 722 722 722
R2 0.652 0.716 0.658 0.718
Prob> χ2, F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OLS estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on workers, are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed. The independent variable log(wit) is
the logarithm of the hourly wage. Fixed effects are normalized such that the constant reflects the mean
of the omitted category. ∆i is the difference between the wage a worker considered to be fair and the
base wage (treatment CHF22). “High-skilled” is a dummy for worker ability, which takes the value one if
a worker’s fixed effect is above the median and a zero otherwise. The sample is restricted to the workers
who participated in the follow-up survey. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Second, because we measured fairness perceptions ten weeks after the field experiment,
we examine whether exposure to the high wage affected the fairness perceptions. Workers
with a high exposure to treatment CHF27 may have considered the base wage to be more
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unfair, meaning that fairness perceptions could be just a proxy for exposure to the high
wage.
Exposure is measured as the fraction of shifts a worker received the high wage. We di-
vide workers into two groups: workers with an exposure above the median (high-exposure),
and those with an exposure below the median (low-exposure). Figure 1.8 shows the dis-
tribution of fairness perceptions in the two groups. The figure suggests a similar pattern
for both groups and a Mann-Whitney rank sum test cannot reject the null that the two
distributions are the same (p = 0.909).
Figure 1.8: Robustness Check for Exposure to the High Wage
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This figure plots the difference between the wage workers considered to be
fair for this job and the base wage (treatment CHF22), shown separately for
workers who were often and those who were rarely exposed to the high wage
(treatment CHF27).
To provide a more rigorous test, we additionally regress individual fairness perceptions
on exposure to the high wage using OLS. The point estimate of exposure is 0.19 and thus
very low, as shown in Table 1.7. This means that raising the fraction of high-wage shifts
from zero to hundred percent increases the wage workers considered to be fair by CHF
0.19. The 90 percent confidence interval ends at CHF 1.3, which is still modest considering
that the hourly fair wage varies by as much as CHF 12.
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Table 1.7: Robustness Check for Exposure to the High Wage
Dependent variable:
Fair wage – base wage (in CHF/h)
CHF27 exposure 0.190
(0.684)
Constant 0.992**
(0.431)
N 119
R2 0.000
Prob> χ2, F 0.782
OLS estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on workers, are in parentheses. The dependent
variable ∆i is the difference between the wage a worker considered to be fair and the base wage (treatment
CHF22). The independent variable “CHF27 exposure” is the fraction of shifts a worker received the high
wage (treatment CHF27). Fixed effects are normalized such that the constant reflects the mean of the
omitted category. The sample is restricted to the workers who participated in the follow-up survey. Level
of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1.4.5 Fairness Preferences and the Response to Wage Increases
Having found evidence that workers’ response to higher wages strongly depends on their
fairness perceptions, we now seek to analyze the role of fairness concerns in more detail.
As mentioned above, second mover decisions in the social dilemma experiment allow us to
classify workers as reciprocal and non-reciprocal. According to the reciprocity criterion,
77 out of 118 workers displayed reciprocal fairness.
Thus, we re-estimate equation (1.6) separately for the reciprocal and non-reciprocal
workers. Column (1) of Table 1.8 shows the results for the estimates of equation (1.6) re-
stricted to the reciprocal workers, while Column (2) shows the same for the non-reciprocal.
The results in Column (1) reveal that the coefficient of log(wit) is not significantly related
to work performance. This coefficient represents the impact of a wage increase on work
performance of reciprocal workers who considered the base wage as appropriate. However,
the point estimate of the interaction between log(wit) and ∆i is large and positive, im-
plying that for every CHF that a reciprocal worker felt underpaid, the elasticity of work
performance with respect to wage rises by 0.16. Put another way, the elasticity is -0.02
+ 5·0.16 = 0.78 for reciprocal workers who thought the fair wage was CHF 27.
We find no evidence at all of reaction to the wage increases for the non-reciprocal
workers, no matter whether they felt underpaid, as shown in Column (2) of Table 1.8.
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Even if we compute a very strict difference-in-difference test, there is clear evidence that
the reciprocal workers responded differently to the wage increases than did the non-
reciprocal (p = 0.07).15
Thus, our results demonstrate that when the wage was raised towards the level workers
thought fair, only the reciprocal workers responded to the wage increases with higher work
performance.
Table 1.8: Response of Reciprocal and Non-reciprocal Workers to the Wage Increases
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
Log(hourly copies distributed)
Log(wit) –0.017 0.306
(0.129) (0.253)
Log(wit)×∆i 0.156*** –0.094
(0.047) (0.097)
Constant 4.792*** 5.646***
(0.389) (0.753)
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes
Day fixed effects Yes Yes
N 466 243
R2 0.760 0.783
Prob> χ2, F 0.000 0.000
OLS estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on workers, are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the number of hourly copies distributed. The independent variable log(wit) is
the logarithm of the hourly wage. Fixed effects are normalized such that the constant reflects the mean
of the omitted category. ∆i is the difference between the wage a worker considered to be fair and the
base wage (treatment CHF22). Column (1) shows the estimates for the reciprocal, Column (2) shows
the same for the non-reciprocal workers. The sample is restricted to the workers who participated in the
social dilemma experiment. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
15More formally, denote the coefficient estimates for log(wit) and log(wit) × ∆i for the reciprocal
workers by γrec = (γrec
0
, γrec
2
)′, and for non-reciprocal workers by γno = (γno
0
, γno
2
)′, respectively. Then,
(γrec − γno)′(Σrec + Σno)−1(γrec − γno) will be asymptotically χ2(2)-distributed, where Σi denotes the
relevant parts of the covariance matrix for group i. This is equivalent to estimating a fully interacted
model for the two worker types and testing for significant interaction effects in the response to the wage
increases between the reciprocal and non-reciprocal workers.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides evidence on whether higher wages motivate workers to provide
more work effort voluntarily. We find that raising the wage caused a small but significant
increase in work performance. However, the small overall effect masks substantial het-
erogeneity in workers’ response to wage increases. Our study allows us to trace whether
workers’ response is related to their fairness perceptions and preferences. We show that
the overall effect is purely driven by workers who both initially felt underpaid and who
revealed a propensity for reciprocal fairness. The estimated elasticity of the effect is 0.78
for these workers, which means that raising the wage by 10 percent increases work perfor-
mance by 7.8 percent. By contrast, selfish workers or those who considered the base wage
to be appropriate did not respond to pay raises. Their behavior is significantly different
from the group of fair-minded workers who perceived the base wage as unfairly low. We
consider several possible confounds that would threaten the validity of our estimates, but
find no evidence for this. On the whole, our evidence strongly corroborates the fair-wage
effort hypothesis put forward in Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
Our results have important implications for wage setting and provide a potential rec-
onciliation for the seemingly incompatible findings in laboratory and field experiments. It
is a feature of all earlier field studies that the base wage was comparatively high, meaning
that many subjects, as in our study, may have already felt paid fairly before a pay raise.
Yet, our findings show that workers are only likely to work more if they initially feel un-
derpaid. This implies that a wage increase only affects work performance if it alleviates
perceived unfairness, but not if it merely improves an already fair outcome. When we
apply the methodology of earlier studies, and ignore how fairness perceptions and pref-
erences affect workers’ response to wage increases, we also find a modest effect. Thanks
to a sample much larger than in earlier studies, however, we have enough power to reject
the hypothesis of no effect.
Our finding that higher wages only affect work performance when workers feel treated
unfairly is consistent with Mas (2006), who finds that police officers’ performance is very
sensitive to disappointing arbitration outcomes in wage bargaining. In contrast, Mas
(2006) finds little evidence that performance is sensitive to the size of an unexpectedly
good outcome. It is tentative to conclude that disappointing outcomes were below what
the police officers perceived to be fair. Given that our results share these two qualitative
features, this channel appears particularly plausible.
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From a methodological point of view, our results highlight the importance of com-
plementing field experiments with additional outside information (for example, through
surveys or lab experiments) that allow a deeper examination of the psychological mech-
anisms that drive the response to an experimental intervention. We not only show that
fairness perceptions modulate workers’ response to a wage increase, but that preferences
do so as well. As in lab experiments, we find that not all individuals respond to a change
in fairness. Our additional “lab” experiment reveals that only fair-minded individuals
respond to changes in fairness, while selfish individuals do not. Hence, the composition of
the workforce not only in terms of fairness perceptions but also with respect to preferences
determines the effectiveness of a wage increase. Because of many potential confounds, an
exact measurement of preferences is seldom possible in a field study. Therefore, our results
also underline the usefulness of lab experiments for understanding field behavior.
It is difficult to find plausible alternative interpretations of our findings. In particu-
lar, one interpretation that has received attention in previous work does not apply here.
Al-Ubaydli et al. (2008) find that treating workers more generously increases work per-
formance. They interpret their results in terms of a repeated-game context, as there is
at least some scope for reputation incentives in their setting.16 These concerns would
have contradicted the results we found in our setting. If workers feared being dismissed
for insufficient work effort, we should expect an interaction effect of the opposite sign.
Workers who felt well-paid would have had more at stake if they were fired. They should
have been particularly sensitive to the employer’s demands and should have reacted more
to the wage increases. But we find that they responded less, which is inconsistent with
this interpretation.
This study also points to new questions for future research. Our results suggest that
firms should increase workers’ wages if they feel underpaid rather if they feel adequately
paid. This is because underpaid workers exhibit a greater elasticity of work performance
with respect to wage. Little is known, however, about how workers respond to changes in
coworkers’ wages. In addition, more research is needed to understand how managers can
influence workers’ fairness perceptions and how these perceptions adjust to labor market
conditions.
16They do not explicitly test this channel in their field experiment, for example, they do not compare
the outcomes to a subset of subjects certain to leave this job. It is therefore difficult to conclusively
attribute the effects to reputation incentives. See List (2006) for a field study that explicitly tests the
role of reputation incentives in a sports card marketplace.
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Chapter 2
Social Comparison in the Workplace
Chapter Summary
We conducted a field experiment to test whether workers respond to wage cuts and
whether their response depends on coworkers’ wages. Workers were organized in teams
of two and paid a flat wage. Either one or both workers in a team suffered a wage cut,
while workers in the control treatment continued to earn the initial wage. We show in
a difference-in-differences analysis that cutting both workers’ wage reduced work perfor-
mance significantly. However, cutting only one worker’s wage resulted in a decrease in
performance that was twice as large. In contrast, the spared worker’s performance re-
mained unaffected. These findings corroborate the fair wage-effort hypothesis, which can
explain involuntary unemployment and wage compression.
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2.1 Introduction
Standard economic models of labor markets assume that workers respond exclusively to
economic incentives and only care about the absolute level of income. These models do
not take into account that fairness motives and social comparison may determine worker
behavior. The relevance of these motivational forces, however, was long emphasized in
social psychology (Festinger, 1954; Homans, 1961; Adams, 1963) and sociology (Davis,
1959; Runciman, 1966; Pollis, 1968). Textbooks on personnel management also regard
the need for fair and equitable treatment of workers as obvious. Kochan and Barocci
(1985) quote approvingly from a War Labor Board project (by William H. Davis):
There is no single factor in the whole field of labor relations that does more to
break down morale, create individual dissatisfaction, encourage absenteeism,
increase labor turnover and hamper production than obviously unjust inequal-
ities in the wage rates paid to different individuals in the same labor group
within the same plant.
These ideas have since been partially integrated into the economic theory of labor markets.
A well-known example is the fair wage-effort model by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) which
states that workers’ fairness concerns constrain firms’ wage setting. The model draws
on two key assumptions: first, workers withhold effort when they perceive that they are
paid less than the fair wage, and second, the fair wage depends on the wages paid to the
coworkers in the same firm. Under these assumptions, the firm’s wage setting may lead
to involuntary unemployment and wage compression.
In this chapter we report evidence from a randomized field experiment exploring
whether workers respond to wage cuts and the extent to which wages paid to cowork-
ers influence their responses. We conducted the field experiment in collaboration with a
firm that sells a card permitting customers to attend parties at selected bars and night-
clubs. The firm hired workers for two weeks to sell a promotional card at a price of
e 5 or in exchange for customer data. Workers had to work in teams of two.1 In the
pre-intervention week, all workers earned a flat base wage. In the post-intervention week,
teams were randomly assigned to one of three treatments: in the control treatment, work-
ers continued to earn the base wage; in the second treatment, both workers in a team
1Team members worked independently of each other, i.e., we observe the amount of sold cards for
each worker individually.
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suffered a wage cut; in the third treatment, only one randomly chosen worker in a team
suffered a wage cut, while the other worker continued to earn the base wage. To rule
out reputation incentives, workers’ employment was limited to two weeks without the
prospect of future employment.
We show that workers’ performance largely depends on the wages paid to cowork-
ers. When only one worker in a team suffered a pay cut while the coworker was spared,
performance of the worker with the lower wage declined sharply by 34 percent. In con-
trast, when a worker suffered the wage cut along with the coworker, work performance
only decreased by 15 percent. This difference in responses is highly significant. When
workers were spared from the wage cut while their coworker was not, the spared workers’
performance was not affected.
To our knowledge, the present study is the first field experiment to examine the causal
effects of wage differentials on worker performance. Empirical evidence on the relevance
of social comparison in the workplace has only recently emerged, and the results are
mixed. Previous findings stem primarily from laboratory experiments. Aside from the
debate whether results from laboratory settings can be generalized to the field (Falk and
Heckman, 2009), laboratory experiments entail additional issues when studying social
comparison effects.
First, natural and salient references for comparison are poorly induced because sub-
jects in laboratory multi-worker firms typically do not interact with each other on a
personal level. The fact that they often do not compare themselves with their coworkers
is thus not particularly surprising in this case. For example, in Ga¨chter et al. (2008),
subjects did not interact, other than observing anonymous coworkers’ wages and effort
levels before choosing own effort. As a result, subjects did not respond to coworkers’
wages and effort levels. In our field experiment, we created a natural and salient person
for comparison by forming teams of two workers who were employed together on two
consecutive weekends.
Second, implementing unequal wages in the laboratory is problematic when subjects
play the role of the firm and workers are essentially identical. Wage differentials are
then rarely observed because there is no basis for wage discrimination. To address this
problem, Charness and Kuhn (2007) introduced productivity differentials among workers.
Although unequal wages were common, workers did not respond to wages paid to cowork-
ers. Unequal wages might not be perceived as unfair when workers know that they differ
in productivity. Instead of implementing productivity differentials, Tho¨ni and Ga¨chter
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(2009) applied the strategy method to elicit responses to wage differentials. Their re-
sults lend some support for social comparison, but are inconclusive on the whole. In our
study, differences between workers did not justify the wage differentials we exogenously
introduced. In fact, any justification of wage differentials mitigates social comparison
effects. For example, Hennig-Schmidt et al. (forthcoming) justified unequal wages by in-
forming one group of workers that less money was available for them than for the other
group. This explanation might have made workers consider wage differences acceptable,
and therefore avoids a social comparison effect. The fair wage-effort model, however,
posits that only wage changes that also affect wage fairness induce effort variations. We
therefore purposely left wage differentials unjustified.
Non-experimental field studies are not better suited for identifying social compar-
ison effects because factors unobservable to the researcher may determine both wage
differentials and effort choices (Shearer, 2003).2 We address this endogeneity problem by
randomizing wage differentials.
Much of our previous understanding about the harmful effects of wage cuts on work
motivation relies on laboratory experiments and manager interviews. Fehr and Falk
(1999), for example, conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate downward wage
rigidity in competitive labor markets. They find that firms fear low and unprofitable effort
levels as a consequence of low wages and are therefore reluctant to accept low wage offers
from previously unemployed workers. As a result, wages settle above the competitive
level.
Bewley (1999) provides an example for an interview study on wage stickiness. He
reports that managers are reluctant to cut pay during a recession because they are afraid
of the negative effects on work morale. Although interview studies are suggestive, the
findings only reflect managers’ opinions and not worker behavior.3
In a non-experimental study, Lee and Rupp (2007) examine the effects of wage cuts on
flight delays in the airline industry. They find that wage cuts trigger hostile responses only
when the cut is perceived to be unfair. As for wage differentials, non-experimental field
studies on wage cuts do not solve the endogeneity problem. In addition, non-experimental
field studies examine worker behavior in ongoing employment relations, making it difficult
2Torgler et al. (2008) investigate the relevance of social comparison among basketball and soccer play-
ers. They find that either situation – earning more or earning less than teammates – reduces performance.
3For example, managers may be reluctant to cut wages because they would have to deal with offended
workers who might contest the situation; this would not necessarily imply, however, that the workers
would work less.
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to disentangle fairness motives from reputation incentives (Howitt, 2002).4
To date, only Kube et al. (2010a) provide clean evidence on the negative effects of wage
cuts on worker performance. In their field experiment, workers reduced their performance
significantly when the wage was lower than the promised wage.
2.2 Experiment
2.2.1 Economic Environment
We conducted the field experiment in collaboration with a German firm that operates a
nightlife online portal and sells a card that permits attendance to parties in selected bars
and nightclubs. In 2008, the firm initiated a promotion to increase its brand awareness.
For this promotion, it hired workers to sell a promotional card in public places and
nightclubs.
2.2.2 Recruitment
Workers were hired over a job market database that listed workers with experience in
promotion jobs. They were unaware that they were participating in an experiment. To
ensure this, we excluded applicants who knew someone from the firm’s permanent staff.
Hires received a guarantee that they could work on two consecutive weekends and it was
made clear that there was no prospect of further employment at the firm.5
Upon arriving for the training session, workers were randomly allocated to teams
of two and randomly assigned to be either “worker 1” or “worker 2” in a team. Both
workers, however, had completely identical tasks and responsibilities. By forming teams
of two workers who worked together on two consecutive weekends, we created a natural
and salient reference for comparison, namely the coworker in a team.
Workers were then informed about the objective of the promotion, its structure and
procedures, as well as with the equipment and clothing. Furthermore, they were trained
how to approach potential customers.
4For example, when firms cut wages, workers may simply punish the firm with lower effort as part of
an equilibrium trigger strategy.
5This eliminated reputation incentives.
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2.2.3 Task
Workers’ task was to sell the promotional card at a price of e 5 or in exchange for a
customer’s personal information6. Teams were assigned a fixed point-of-sale which was
either a public place or a nightclub. Working hours were Friday and Saturday from 5pm
to 8pm for public places, respectively 11pm to 2am for nightclubs.
During these three-hour shifts, workers were mostly on their own and thus had full
discretion over the amount of exerted effort. In addition, points-of-sale provided an at-
tractive opportunity to shirk because workers could unobtrusively converse privately, and
they could always claim that nobody wanted to buy the card.
Each team was managed by a team leader, who met the workers before and after
work shifts. Team leaders supplied workers with promotional cards, assessed the points-
of-sale (for example, number of club visitors), and looked after the workers once or twice
per shift. After the shifts, they collected the revenues, customer information, and the
remaining cards.7
2.2.4 Treatments
We implemented a differences-in-differences setup with a pre- and a post-intervention
week and four treatment groups (HH, LL, HL1, and HL2). The pre-intervention week
permits the measurement of workers’ baseline performance, thus controlling for worker
heterogeneity. This baseline is important because ability and therefore performance may
vary strongly across workers.
In the pre-intervention week, all workers earned an hourly base wage of e 12. For the
post-intervention week, we randomly assigned teams to one of three treatments. In the
control treatment, “HH”, both worker 1 and worker 2 continued to earn the hourly base
wage of e 12.8 In the second treatment, “LL”, both worker 1 and worker 2 suffered a
wage cut down to e 9 per hour. In the third treatment, “HL”, only worker 2 suffered a
6Customer information was recorded in a database, and invitations to join the online platform were
sent to the customers. False information could be identified and attributed to the worker who had
acquired it. Workers did not know, however, that the correctness of customer information was verified.
7Team leaders were permanent employees of the firm and each of them was responsible for two to three
teams. They received a comprehensive set of instructions about their communication with the workers
and the handling of potentially problematic situations. In particular, they were instructed to treat all
workers in the same manner and were prohibited to motivate or rebuke individual workers.
8Team leaders used the phrase “You continue to earn e 12 per hour. This was the manager’s decision.”
and analogous phrases in the other treatments.
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wage cut down to e 9 per hour, while worker 1 still earned the base wage of e 12 per hour
(see Table 2.1 for a summary of the treatments). Thus, treatment HL consists of two
groups: group “HL1” is composed of workers 1 in treatment HL, while “HL2” is made up
of workers 2.
Table 2.1: Hourly wages (in e)
Treatment HH LL HL
Worker 1 2 1 2 1 2
Pre-intervention 12 12 12 12 12 12
Post-intervention 12 12 9 9 12 9
Team leaders did not give a reason for the wage cut to prevent altering the wage that
workers consider fair. For example, workers’ notion of a fair wage could have changed if
team leaders had told that the firm faced the risk of bankruptcy. In addition, devising
a cover story would have deceived the workers, which would have been a departure from
standard convention among experimental economists.
2.2.5 Design Specifics
Three important aspects of this field experiment need to be stressed. First, we imple-
mented a wage cut so that workers earned, on average, at least the promised wage. Thus,
we initially raised all workers’ hourly wage from e 10 to e 12.9 This avoids ethical con-
cerns associated with experimental pay cuts. In addition, the wage increase helps prevent
an attrition bias. Drop-outs after a wage cut would be uninformative because they could
be interpreted either as a hostile response or the choice of an outside option because the
wage had fallen below a worker’s reservation wage. This initial wage increase, however,
is associated with the potential cost of mitigating the treatment effects.
Second, we adapted the organizational structure of the promotion to maximize the
number of subjects. We ran the promotion twice, hiring different workforces each time.10
In addition, we ran the promotions in two cities and at two different types of points-of-sale
in each of the promotion drives. This made some balancing constraints on the treatment
9Upon being hired, workers were promised an hourly wage of e 10. Then, at the beginning of the first
shift, team leaders informed the workers about the wage increase. If workers asked for a reason, they
were told that the manager had made the decision.
10Workers from the first promotional drive never had contact with workers from the second drive.
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assignment desirable.11 We assigned treatments evenly to the two points in time, cities,
and types of points-of-sale. These constraints minimize time, city, and location type-
specific differences across treatments. To maximize statistical power, each of the four
treatment groups comprised the same number of workers (i.e., treatment HL comprised
as many workers as treatments HH and LL together). We also ran treatment HL at each
point-of-sale: the first time at half of the points-of-sale, and the second time at the other
half (i.e., each point-of-sale was assigned to treatment HL once and to either treatment
HH or LL the other time). Furthermore, we stratified treatment assignment by gender,
and also formed same gender teams to avoid confounds.12
Third, we allocated workers who knew each other to the same treatment, thus prevent-
ing communication among workers from different treatments in order to avoid treatment
contamination. We separated friends into different teams, however, to preclude friendship
arrangements within teams. In addition, allocation of teams in time and space ensured
that teams from different treatments could not possibly meet.
2.3 Behavioral Predictions
Using a simple framework, we analyze how workers respond to wage cuts and how their
response depends on the wages paid to their coworkers. Consider a firm that employs two
identical workers, worker 1 and worker 2, for a one-time job and pays them a flat wage.
Each worker in return generates revenue for the firm by exerting costly effort. The firm’s
payoff per worker is revenue generated by the worker minus her wage. The worker’s payoff
is the wage minus her effort cost.
Assume first that workers exclusively maximize their own material interest. The pre-
diction is then straightforward: since workers receive a guaranteed wage that is not con-
tingent on their performance, their effort will not respond to a change in the flat wage as
long as the wage remains above their reservation wage.13
11Assignment to worker 1 and worker 2 was randomized unconditionally.
12For example, HL2 workers in mixed-gender teams might reduce their performance because they felt
they were victims of sexual discrimination.
13Alternatively, a high wage could be regarded as a disciplining device for selfish workers (Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984): workers provide high effort to avoid being fired and losing the high wage. After a wage
cut, workers decrease their effort because they have less to lose. This model predicts a general drop in
effort towards the end of the employment and, after a wage cut, the same decrease in effort regardless
of the coworker’s wage. In our setup, however, this theory is implausible because there was no threat of
firing.
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Now assume that in addition to their own material interest, workers care about fair-
ness, and their fairness perceptions are based on either the actions or outcomes of others.14
For example, workers could view a wage cut as a hostile act by the firm and as a conse-
quence reduce their effort. If only one worker’s wage is cut, he or she could consider this
act even more hostile and further amplify the effort reduction. Alternatively, inequalities
in outcome might influence worker behavior. Outcome-oriented fairness models have the
advantage of being tractable. We therefore use the model of inequity aversion by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) to generate our hypotheses,15 and to derive the formal predictions in
the Appendix.
Suppose that workers dislike inequity when comparing their own payoff, that of their
coworkers, and the profit the firm earns. Not only effort cost, but payoff comparison as
well, determines a worker’s effort. Higher effort decreases own payoff and increases the
firm’s payoff, but leaves the coworker’s payoff unaffected.
With regard to the firm, wage payment by definition creates inequity to the workers’
advantage. The firm-worker payoff difference is proportional to the wage. Thus, the
higher the wage, the more effort workers must provide in order to eliminate this inequity.
In treatments HH and LL, both team members are paid the same wage. To avoid inequity
between them, they will both provide the same effort. To prevent inequity with respect
to the firm, workers’ effort will be lower in treatment LL than in HH.
In treatment HL, the firm pays worker 2 a lower wage than worker 1. In this case, payoff
comparisons both with the firm and with the coworker affect effort choices. Consider
worker 1 first: provided that both workers exert the same level of effort as in HH, worker
1 receives the same payoff as the firm but a higher payoff than worker 2. Consequently,
worker 1 could increase her effort in order to reduce advantageous inequity with respect to
her coworker. This, however, would increase not only effort cost but also overall inequity:
while an increase in effort decreases the inequality between workers as worker 1’s payoff is
reduced, it creates a larger inequality between her and the firm through both a reduction
in her own payoff and an increase of the firm’s payoff. Worker 1 will therefore not exert
more effort; as a result, HL1 effort will be the same as in treatment HH.
Consider now worker 2: provided that both workers exert the same level of effort as in
14Action-oriented fairness models include Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and
Fischbacher (2006); outcome-oriented fairness models include Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000); Levine (1998) presents a type-based fairness model.
15The purpose of our experiment is to provide causal evidence on the effect of social comparison on
work performance and not to discriminate between closely related fairness models.
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HH, worker 2 receives a lower payoff than the firm and worker 1. Hence, reducing effort
decreases not only effort cost but also inequity with respect to both the firm and the
coworker. In order to equalize payoffs with respect to the firm, worker 2 would provide
the same low effort level as in LL. Yet, at this effort level, worker 2 still gets a smaller
payoff than worker 1.16 If worker 2 further decreases her effort, she not only saves effort
cost but also reduces disadvantageous inequity with respect to her coworker; this comes
at the cost of a disparity between her and the firm to her advantage. This cost, however,
is small because envy looms larger than compassion. Worker 2 therefore provides less
effort than when both workers earn the low wage; consequently, HL2 effort is lower than
in treatment LL.
In summary, the model generates the following hypotheses about the change in effort
from pre- to post-intervention week:
if workers are sufficiently inequity averse, then
(H1) workers in treatment LL decrease their effort after the wage cut.
(H2) workers in treatment group HL2 decrease their effort after the wage cut more than
those in treatment LL.
(H3) workers in treatment group HL1 do not change their effort after the wage cut.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of 96 workers in 48 teams. Table 2.2 shows that workers were pre-
dominantly women (77 percent) and, on average, in their early twenties (mean age: 20.7
years). All but one was of German nationality; 29 workers, however, had a second nation-
ality (mostly Eastern European). Of the 96 workers, three workers got sick before any
wage cut was announced and missed out on the entire post-intervention week.17 However,
no worker dropped out because of the wage cut.
In total, workers sold 8750 promotional cards; mean sales were 22.8 cards per three-
hour shift and worker. Only 187 customers (2.1 percent) chose to pay e 5 for the card,
16Recall that a reduction in effort decreases inequity with respect to the firm more effectively than
inequity with respect to the coworker because own effort affects the firm’s payoff but it does not affect
coworker’s payoff.
17These workers were replaced by spare workers who were treated in exactly the same way as the
replaced workers would have been treated. We exclude spare workers from the analysis, however.
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while the remaining sales were generated by collecting customer information. Of the 8563
sets of customer information, only 191 (2.2 percent) were false.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Treatment Group HH LL HL1 HL2 Total
# Workers 24 24 24 24 96
# Female 18 18 19 19 74
Age (mean) 20.5 21.2 20.2 21.1 20.7
# Reported sick 1 1 0 1 3
Sales per shift (mean)
Pre-intervention 20.8 22.4 24.3 22.0 22.4
Post-intervention 22.8 21.4 26.5 18.4 22.3
2.4.2 Control Variables
We balanced the treatments over variables known in advance (points in time, city, point-
of-sale, and gender). Two particular factors, however, were impossible to anticipate,
namely how many customers the workers would meet at the points-of-sale (demand), and
heterogeneity in worker characteristics. Both factors influence worker performance and
can cause spurious correlations in the data if they are not accounted for.
Based on their visits during work shifts, team leaders assessed demand on a 5-point
scale (-2 = low, 2 = high). We use this assessment to test for systematic variation
in demand across treatments. A Kruskal-Wallis test cannot reject the null hypothesis
that demand was equally distributed across treatments (p = 0.23).18 Nevertheless, there
is considerable variation in demand (standard deviation: 1.19). In order to estimate
treatment effects more precisely, we also report a specification where we include demand
as an additional control in the regression analysis.
To control for worker heterogeneity, we implemented a difference-in-differences design
which allows us to include individual fixed effects in the regression analysis.19 Many field
studies report substantial heterogeneity in worker ability and point out the importance of
controlling for this heterogeneity whenever possible (Shearer, 2004; Fehr and Go¨tte, 2007;
Mas and Moretti, 2009).
18All p-values in the analysis are two-sided.
19As workers were always assigned to the same point-of-sale, individual fixed effects also capture
location-specific differences.
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2.4.3 Impact of Wage Cuts on Work Performance
Workers could exert effort in two dimensions of performance: quantity (cards sold) and
quality (correctness of customer information). Our measure of effort is quality-adjusted
performance, defined as the total number of cards sold less sales due to customer data
that were verified as incorrect.20 With random treatment assignment, we can estimate
the average causal effect of an intervention by comparing pre- and post-intervention dif-
ferences in performance across treatments. We first conservatively analyze the impact
of the treatments on performance by applying non-parametric tests. For convenience,
we normalize quantities as percentages of the pre-intervention performance average ypre,
resulting in the following hypotheses:
(H1) Workers in treatment LL reduce performance compared to those in the control
treatment:
yLLpost − y
LL
pre
ypre
<
yHHpost − y
HH
pre
ypre
(H2) Workers in treatment group HL2 reduce performance more than those in treatment
LL:
yHL2post − y
HL2
pre
ypre
<
yLLpost − y
LL
pre
ypre
(H3) Workers in treatment group HL1 provide the same performance as those in the
control treatment:
yHL1post − y
HL1
pre
ypre
=
yHHpost − y
HH
pre
ypre
Figure 2.1 shows the percentage change in performance from pre- to post-intervention
week by treatment. Performance in the control treatment HH increased non-significantly
20The empirical results do not change if we include incorrect customer data in the analysis.
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by 8 percent relative to the pre-intervention average (p = 0.58, Wilcoxon Signed Rank),
which points to learning effects. Conforming to our hypotheses, we test for differences
between this baseline change and changes in the other treatments. Compared to the
control treatment, performance in treatment LL decreased non-significantly by 13 per-
centage points (p = 0.37, Mann-Whitney U), lending weak support for hypothesis (H1).
By contrast, a wage cut for only one worker had a dramatic impact on performance: work-
ers in the HL2 group significantly decreased their performance by 24 percentage points
compared to the control treatment (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney U). This reduction in per-
formance is also stronger than the decrease in the LL group (p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney U),
providing strong first evidence for hypothesis (H2): workers reacted more drastically to
wage cuts when the coworker was spared. Moreover, if we compare the paired observations
within HL teams, we see that HL2 workers also reduced their performance compared to
their coworkers (p < 0.01, Wilcoxon Signed Rank). Finally, the spared coworkers hardly
responded to the wage cut: HL1 workers increased their performance by 2 percentage
points compared to the control group (p = 0.37, Mann-Whitney U), which is consistent
with hypothesis (H3).
Figure 2.1: Impact of Wage Cuts on Work Performance
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Panel (H1) compares the performance change in treatment group HH (control)
and LL (general wage cut), Panel (H2) compares treatment group LL (general
wage cut) and HL2 (unilateral wage cut), while Panel (H3) compares treatment
group HH (control) and HL1 (spared workers).
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Our non-parametric analysis does not control for differences in demand and worker
characteristics. To address this issue, we estimate a difference-in-differences regression
model that uses the balanced panel data structure with each worker as a panel unit and
each team as an independent observation:21
log(yikt) = α+ νi + θt + δDkt + β1I
LL
kt + β2I
HL1
kt + β3I
HL2
kt + ǫikt (2.1)
where log(yikt) denotes the logarithm of the performance per shift of worker i in team k and
week t; the constant α captures the average pre-intervention performance, νi represents
individual fixed effects, θt captures the baseline trend from pre- to post-intervention week,
and Dkt controls for differences in demand; I
g
kt are intervention dummies for whether the
respective intervention has affected treatment group g in week t (the omitted category
is the control group HH); finally, ǫikt is the idiosyncratic error term, which is clustered
over teams. Recall that individual fixed effects not only capture time invariant differences
across workers but also location-specific factors because workers were always assigned to
the same point-of-sale.22
Table 2.3 shows the estimates for the treatment effects. Column (1) presents the re-
sults for equation (2.1) omitting the control variable for demand. The “Post-intervention”
dummy represents the percentage change in baseline performance from pre- to post-
intervention week. The coefficient of this dummy shows that performance in treatment HH
increased non-significantly by 6 percent (p = 0.47, t-Test). The intervention dummies, i.e.
the three interactions “g× Post-intervention”, describe how the change in performance
differed with respect to the control group. In treatment LL, the change in performance
was 11 percentage points lower than in treatment HH; this negative response is twice as
large in magnitude as the baseline change, reaffirming hypothesis (H1). However, data
are too noisy to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between treatment HH and
LL (p = 0.25, t-Test). Compared to treatment HH, however, workers in the HL2 group
reduced their performance by 31 percentage points (p < 0.01, t-Test). They responded
three times more strongly to the wage cut than workers in treatment LL (p = 0.01,
Wald-Test), which strongly corroborates hypothesis (H2). In line with hypothesis (H3),
workers in group HL1 did not significantly increase their performance compared to the
control group (p = 0.72, t-Test).
21For an exposition of difference-in-differences, see citetbertrand04.
22As expected, the fixed effects parameters are highly significant (p < 0.001, F-test).
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In order to reduce residual variance, we include demand as a control variable in Column
(2).23 The coefficient of demand is highly significant (p < 0.01, t-Test) and has the
expected sign: the more potential customers, the likelier workers could sell a card. The
inclusion of the demand variable does not qualitatively change the results. It allows us,
however, to estimate the treatment coefficients more precisely. As a consequence, the
influence of the wage cut affecting both workers is now significant at the 10 percent level.
The point estimates for the two wage cut interventions imply a performance reduction of
15 percentage points for the LL group (p = 0.07, t-Test) and 34 percentage points for the
HL2 group (p < 0.01, t-Test). The difference between the LL and the HL2 group is again
highly significant (p = 0.01, Wald-Test). The coefficient for the HL1 group remains small
and insignificant (p = 0.87, t-Test).
Table 2.3: Impact of Wage Cuts on Work Performance
Dependent variable:
Log(sales) (1) (2)
Post-intervention 0.058 0.090
(0.080) (0.074)
LL × Post-intervention −0.106 −0.145*
(0.090)) (0.079)
HL1× Post-intervention 0.034 0.015
(0.095) (0.089)
HL2× Post-intervention −0.306*** −0.342***
(0.103) (0.101)
Demand 0.117***
(0.034)
Constant 3.057*** 3.048***
(0.015) (0.015)
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 189 179
Adj. R2 0.202 0.312
OLS estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on teams, are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the total number of cards sold less sales due to customer data that were
verified as incorrect. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Taken together, the results in Table 2.3 weakly support hypothesis (H1), but they
strongly corroborate hypothesis (H2). The results demonstrate that workers are not
23When demand is included in the regression, the number of observations decreases by 10 because the
demand measure is missing for some shifts.
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only concerned about their own wage. Rather, workers compare themselves with their
coworkers and respond more negatively to wage cuts if they end up earning less than their
coworkers. Finally, consistent with hypothesis (H3), preferentially treated workers do not
increase their effort, pointing out the boundaries of social comparison effects.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter reports evidence from a randomized field experiment investigating fairness
motives and social comparison in a real-life employment situation. When both workers in
a team suffered a wage cut of 25 percent, performance declined by 15 percent. We may
even underestimate this effect because workers initially received a wage increase. This
wage increase partially outweighed the wage cut, thus, workers may have perceived the
wage cut as less unfair.
This result provides causal evidence on why firms often refuse to cut wages even though
excess labor supply exists and labor markets have not yet cleared. The question about
downward wage stickiness has played a key role in a long-lasting macroeconomic debate
starting with Keynes in the 1930s. Bewley (1999) was able to show that managers regard
fairness as the most important reason for downward wage rigidity. In Bewley’s interviews,
managers revealed that they were afraid of workers’ resentment in response to wage cuts.
To date, behavioral evidence for the fairness explanation is still scarce because exogenous
wage cuts are rarely observed.24 We fill this gap by implementing randomized wage cuts
in a real-life job of limited duration to exclude explanations other than fairness.
Our main result demonstrates the key role of social comparison in the workplace.
When only one worker in a team suffered a wage cut of 25 percent, the affected worker’s
performance declined, on average, by 34 percent. This effect is much stronger than the
effect of the pay cut for both workers in a team, even though the wage was reduced by
the same amount. This result provides clear evidence for the conjecture that workers
respond to wages paid to their coworkers. In contrast, spared workers did not respond to
the wage cut their coworkers suffered. This asymmetric effect speaks to the results of a
field experiment by Cohn et al. (2009). They show that workers who feel overpaid do not
respond to wage increases, while workers who feel underpaid respond with a performance
increase.
This study sheds light on why firms usually avoid paying some workers less than
24The only exception known to us is Kube et al. (2010b).
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others on the same job. In the 1980s, for example, airline companies such as American
Airlines, Delta, or Northwest introduced two-tier wage systems where new hires were
paid less than incumbent workers. These wage policies, however, were phased out in
the 1990s due to the resentment of the workers as well as the high turnover these lower
wages generated (Card, 1997). In a New York Times article, Salpukas (1987) noted that
two-tier wage systems have “produced a resentful class of workers who in some cases
are taking their hostility out on customers”. Social comparison may also affect strategic
decisions of companies, such as mergers and acquisitions. For instance, the acquisition of
Piedmont Aviation by U.S. Airways entailed unexpectedly high acquisition cost due to
wage increases at Piedmont to U.S. Airways’ more generous salary levels (Kole and Lehn,
2000). Such costly measures are necessary to ensure internal pay equity. When General
Electric (GE) acquired NBC in 1986, for example, engineers at GE were angered by the
fact that their colleagues at NBC earned higher salaries (Camerer and Malmendier, 2005).
Our study provides causal evidence that wage disparities within firms also greatly damage
productivity. This provides a plausible reason why firms frequently prefer compensation
practices that maintain firm-internal equity such as wage compression (Akerlof and Yellen,
1990) and wage secrecy (Lawler, 1990).
Together, these two findings correspond to the behavioral relation between wages and
effort levels described in the phenomenological model by Akerlof and Yellen (1990).25 It
is important to note that other efficiency wage models, such as the well-known shirking
model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), cannot explain these results. In particular, this
alternative model does not predict that responses to wage cuts depend on coworker wages.
The present study focuses on one specific determinant of workers’ fair wage, namely
coworkers’ wages. Although this may be the most important determinant, there may be
others. For example, past wages may influence what workers think they are entitled to
(Kahneman et al., 1986). Thus, fairness considerations may also have severe implications
for the optimal wage policy over time.
Another important aspect is the communication of wage policies. For example, workers
may be willing to accept wage cuts when they feel that they are justified (Greenberg, 1990).
Therefore, managers may prevent adverse consequences following from pay cuts if they
can thoroughly and sensitively explain the reason for the wage reduction, for example in
order to avoid bankruptcy.
25As shown in the appendix, this behavioral pattern can be derived from recently developed models of
social preferences.
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Chapter 3
Cooperation, Collusion and Social
Interaction
Chapter Summary
We conducted a controlled field experiment to analyze how social interaction affects work
performance under team and relative incentives. Under team incentives, when individual
effort imposed a positive externality on the team member’s income, social interaction
had no impact on work performance. By contrast, under relative incentives, when effort
imposed a negative externality, social interaction caused a substantial drop in work per-
formance. Moreover, in teams with homogeneous skills, social interaction also reduced
within-team performance differences. Both findings provide evidence that social interac-
tion evoked collusion in the presence of negative externalities. However, collusion grew
increasingly difficult the more team members differed in skills. This result points out the
limits of collusion.
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3.1 Introduction
In many jobs, workers impose positive or negative effort externalities on their coworkers.1
If workers fail to internalize the externalities, inefficiencies arise for them. Workers can
prevent these inefficiencies by making implicit effort agreements. These agreements pre-
scribe the effort level that maximizes mutual rather than private surplus. To be effective
as a motivational device, however, agreements need to be enforced by punishing defec-
tors. Social interaction provides workers with the possibility of observing and deterring
agreement violations. A fundamental question is thus whether social interaction facili-
tates cooperation in the presence of positive externalities, and collusion in the presence
of effort externalities respectively.2
We conducted a field experiment to explore the impact of social interaction on work
performance when either positive or negative effort externalities are in place. Workers were
recruited to catalogue books in a university library. They were asked to come to work in
groups of four and randomly divided in teams of two. We then randomly assigned groups
to one of four treatments along two dimensions. First, team members either worked in
the same or in different offices. Social interaction between team members was thus only
possible when they shared an office. Other peer effects, however, were kept constant
because workers shared an office with another worker in all treatments. Second, workers
faced either team or relative incentives. Consequently, effort either imposed a positive or
a negative externality on the team member’s income. However, both the absolute size
of the externality and the expected income were identical in all treatments. In order to
control for skill heterogeneity, all applicants additionally completed a typing speed test
at the end of the online application process.
We find that social interaction had no effect on work performance under team in-
centives. Further investigation reveals that workers internalized the positive externality
irrespective of social interaction. Thus, team incentives did not give rise to a serious
free riding problem. In contrast, social interaction drastically reduced work performance
under relative incentives. This finding suggests that social interaction facilitated collu-
1Effort externalities can be inherent in the production process. For example, supermarket customers
typically choose the register with the shortest waiting line. Thus, for a given number of customers, if
one cashier works at higher pace, other cashiers will have a lower workload (Mas and Moretti, 2009).
Effort externalities can also arise from the incentive schemes. For instance, promotion opportunities
produce negative spillovers between workers because each worker’s effort adversely affects the coworkers’
probability of promotion (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1990).
2We speak of “collusion” when implicit agreements harm the firm and “cooperation” when they help.
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sion, and thus, the internalization of negative externalities. The establishment of collusive
agreements, however, depends on within-team skill heterogeneity because potential gains
from collusion are smaller for high-ability than for low-ability workers. We observe that
social interaction reduced within-team performance differences for team members with
similar skills. By contrast, collusive agreements were increasingly difficult the more team
members differed with regard to their skills.
This study contributes to several strands of the literature. First, dozens of labora-
tory studies report that communication enhances cooperation in social dilemmas (Led-
yard, 1995; Sally, 1995; Ostrom, 2006, for overviews). In a meta-analysis, Bicchieri and
Lev-On (2007) compare the effectiveness of various communication channels and find
that richer media (e.g. video conferences) achieve higher cooperation levels than thinner
communication channels (e.g. chat). They conclude that richer media reveal more in-
formation about the counterpart and therefore simplify the establishment of cooperative
agreements.3 While lab experiments are characterized by a high degree of control, they
are also embedded in highly stylized environments. For example, effort provision is typi-
cally not mentally or physically exhausting but simply a series of monetary transfers. The
extent to which the results from laboratory experiments can be generalized to the field
is thus unclear (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Levitt and List, 2007). Our field experiment
allowed us to observe subjects in a more natural environment, while still maintaining a
high level of experimental control. Moreover, subjects in lab experiments are aware that
the experimenter scrutinizes their behavior. This may give raise to confounding demand
effects (Zizzo, forthcoming). The workers in our study were not aware that they were
participating in an experiment.
Second, two recent non-experimental field studies suggest that mutual monitoring
allows workers to internalize effort externalities. Bandiera et al. (2005) find substantial
productivity gains after a fruit farm switched from relative to individual piece rates. They
observed no such gains, however, when fruit pickers had more difficulties monitoring each
other. Bandiera et al. (2005) conclude that fruit pickers were unable to internalize the
externalities in the absence of mutual monitoring. However, they were unable to ana-
lyze how the robustness of collusive agreements depends on skill heterogeneity. Mas and
3In a more related context, Harbring (2006) finds either enhanced cooperation or collusion, depending
on the situation, when participants were allowed to chat with each other throughout the entire experiment.
In contrast to our study, Harbring (2006) finds that communication is effective not only when negative
but also when positive externalities are in place. The positive and negative externalities, however, were
not comparable in size in her study.
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Moretti (2009) examine scanner data from supermarket cash registers and find produc-
tivity spillovers among cashiers in the presence of positive externalities. These spillovers,
however, only occurred in the line of vision of highly productive cashiers. Mas and Moretti
(2009) conclude that monitoring is essential for internalizing positive externalities. We
extend this literature by measuring social interaction effects in the presence of either
positive or negative effort externalities in the same work environment.
Third, this study also complements the extensive management and psychology litera-
ture studying the effects of office arrangements on workers and their behavior. Scholars
have shown, for example, that moving from closed to open offices increases stress (Wine-
man, 1986) and decreases job satisfaction (Oldham and Brass, 1979). Our field experiment
adds to this literature by demonstrating how office arrangements affect work performance
under different types of incentive schemes.
Finally, the results support Fehr and Falk’s (2002) conjecture that “[. . .] under tour-
nament incentives peer pressure against high performers will develop because high effort
constitutes a negative externality for the competing workers”. Our findings also provide
an explanation for Lazear’s (1989) observation that many firms avoid paying their work-
ers based on tournament incentives, despite their potential to increase firm productivity
considerably (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
3.2 Experiment
3.2.1 Economic Environment
The books in a German university library needed to be electronically catalogued in March
2009. This provided us with the opportunity to conduct a field experiment. For this
purpose, the university supplied four offices with two identical workstations in each office.4
3.2.2 Recruitment
We recruited workers three weeks prior to the experiment. The job was advertised on a
job search website and with posters around the campus and in student dorms. Workers
were offered a one-time job, limited to exactly four hours, at a wage of about e 11 per
hour. Applicants could show interest for the job with an online application form that
4Workstations were furnished with a desk, a notebook connected to the Internet, and an extra key-
board. See Figure 3.1 for an exemplary workstation.
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ended with a five minute typing speed test. The online test was designed to mirror the
future job task and serves as a measure of worker ability.5 All hires were unaware they
were participating in an experiment.6
3.2.3 Task
Upon arriving, workers were provided with an instruction sheet, and a research assistant
explained the task to them.7 Their task was to enter books into an electronic database.8
They had to enter the title, author(s), publisher, ISBN number, and year of publication
for each book. The database application recorded the exact time of each entry, allowing
us to accurately measure performance over time without explicit monitoring.
Figure 3.1: Example of a Workstation
The figure displays a workstation used for the experiment. On each desk there
was a notebook and piles of 250 randomly selected books in total.
5Applicants were hired on the basis of their availability without considering their performance in the
typing speed test.
6Psychology students and applicants with insufficient local language skills were excluded from the
applicant pool. We also made sure that none of the hires had participated in previous experiments at
the local laboratory for economic experiments.
7The research assistants were instructed to follow a strict procedural protocol which included a detailed
description of the communication with the workers.
8At each workstation there were piles of 250 randomly selected books in total. These piles were always
of the same height and piles from different workstations were strictly separated, see Figure 3.1.
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3.2.4 Treatments
Workers were invited to work in single sex groups of four and randomly allocated to
teams of two. Each group of workers was randomly assigned to one of four treatments
along two dimensions. First, the two team members either worked in the same or a
separate office.9 The physical separation of team members consequently prevented social
interaction between them.10 An important aspect of our design is that even in those
treatments when team members were in a separate office, they shared this office with
another person, as shown in Figure 3.2. Other peer effects, such as knowledge spillovers
or distractions due to the presence of a peer, are therefore constant across treatments.
Figure 3.2: Office Arrangements
SOCIAL INTERACTION NO INTERACTION 
Office I 
A1 B1 
Office I 
A1 A2 
Office II 
B1 B2 
Office II 
A2 B2 
The figure illustrates how the office arrangement determined whether social
interaction between team members was possible or not. Teams are denoted by
A and B, and team members by 1 and 2.
Second, workers faced either team or relative incentives. Under team incentives –
when effort provides a positive externality to others – workers earned an hourly wage of
e 3.50 and a piece rate of e 0.10 per entry of the whole team.11 Under relative incentives
9If one of the four workers did not show up, only one team could be formed. Two team members were
then assigned the same office, while the remaining worker was assigned to work alone in an office.
10The research assistants were instructed to keep minutes on whether workers went into the other team
member’s office. This never happened, however.
11We used a pilot study to calibrate the fixed component of the wage under team incentives so that
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– when effort imposes a negative externality on others – workers earned an hourly wage of
e 11.00 and a piece rate that depended on the performance gap between team members:
workers gained (lost) e 0.10 for each book they entered more (less) than their opponent
team member. The incentive schemes share two common features: both the absolute size
of the externality (e 0.10 per entry) and the expected wage (e 11.00 per hour, taking the
income from the incentive scheme into account) were identical.12 The research assistants
made sure that every worker understood the payment scheme and also provided them
with a handout illustrating the incentive scheme in force.
3.3 Behavioral Predictions
If team members are spatially separated, social interaction between them is inhibited. This
implies that selfish workers maximize their private surplus without taking the externality
they impose on the team member’s income into account. Consequently, under either team
or relative incentives, workers will enter books up to the point where their marginal cost
of effort equals their private marginal revenue.
If team members share the same office, social interaction between them is possible.
This allows team members to maximize their joint surplus by establishing implicit effort
agreements that take the externalities into account. Agreements are sustainable if both
team members achieve a higher private surplus by sticking to them than by unilateral
deviation. We assume that the other team member punishes defection.13 The extent
to which team members are able to maximize the joint surplus is determined by the
punishment possibilities. If the punishment threat is sufficiently severe, team members
internalize the externality, at least to some degree.
We therefore predict that social interaction has a positive impact on work performance
when team incentives are in place. In other words, social interaction mitigates the free
riding problem and fosters cooperation. In contrast, we should observe the opposite,
namely a reduction in work performance, when workers face relative incentives. In this
the expected wage corresponded to the projected wage of e 11.00 per hour.
12Single workers received either an hourly wage of e 3.50 and an individual piece rate of e 0.10 per
entry if others were paid according to team incentives, or they earned an hourly wage of e 11.00 if the
others were paid according to relative incentives.
13We assume that punishment for both team members is of equal size and costless, such as verbal
punishment. Cooper and Ku¨hn (2009), for example, show the effectiveness of verbal punishment in a
laboratory experiment on collusion. Relaxing this assumption by allowing for costly punishment would not
change the behavioral mechanism explained here. However, repeated game incentives or social preferences
would be needed in order to make punishment a credible threat.
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case, social interaction eliminates competition through collusion.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of 146 workers in 73 teams.14 Workers were predominantly female (74
percent) and in their mid-twenties (25 years on average). Entering books into a database
is a very simple task. Nevertheless, workers’ abilities vary substantially. Comparing the
top and bottom performance decile in the five minute typing speed test reveals that top
performers were able to enter twice as much as low performers. Performance in this online
test is highly correlated with actual work performance, as indicated in Figure 3.3.15 Work
performance is measured by the number of typed characters in correct book entries.16
Our measure of ability thus allows us to control for skill heterogeneity.
Figure 3.3: Correlation of Ability and Work Performance
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14Under team (relative) incentives, 9 (3) workers could not be allocated to a team because one of the
four workers did not show up.
15The spearman rank correlation between test and work performance is 0.66 and highly significant
(p < 0.0001).
16A research assistant searched for incorrectly entered ISBN numbers and spelling mistakes in the book
titles using an automatic spell check program.
55
3.4.2 Randomization Check
Table 3.1 shows treatment averages for all variables used in this study and tests whether
explanatory variables are equally distributed across treatments. Worker characteristics
appear balanced across the four treatments. There are no significant differences with
respect to test performance (p = 0.46, Kruskal-Wallis test) and age (p = 0.17, Kruskal-
Wallis test). There is, however, one exception: women are less likely to be in the team
incentive treatment without social interaction (p < 0.01, χ2 test). Work conditions are
less balanced because only one treatment per day was conducted.17 Afternoon shifts
(p = 0.49, χ2 test) and the four offices (p-values between 0.45 and 0.84, χ2 test) are
perfectly balanced. Conversely, weekdays (p < 0.01, χ2 test), temperature (p < 0.01,
Kruskal-Wallis test), and sunshine hours (p = 0.08, Kruskal-Wallis test) are not balanced
across treatments. Thus, all regression estimations in the analysis include a specification
that controls for worker characteristics and work conditions.
Table 3.1: Randomization Check
Incentives
TEAM RELATIVE
Interaction SOCIAL NO SOCIAL NO p-Value
Ability (typing speed test) 347.2 363.4 348.7 372.2 0.46
Age 24.3 23.7 24.6 26.1 0.17
Female (in %) 67 56 82 90 <0.01
Afternoon 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.49
Monday 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.01
Tuesday 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 <0.01
Wednesday 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 <0.01
Thursday 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 <0.01
Friday 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 <0.01
Office 1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.84
Office 2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.45
Office 3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.55
Office 4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.77
Temperature (◦C) 15.6 19.4 17.0 17.5 <0.01
Sunshine (in hours) 5.9 8.3 6.3 7.7 0.08
The last column contains p-values (χ2 squared test for binary variables and Kruskal-Wallis test of equality
of populations for non-binary variables) for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization.
17This was done in order to prevent confusion about treatment assignment among the research assis-
tants.
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3.4.3 Social Interaction and Team Incentives
We first examine the impact of social interaction on total work performance under team
incentives. Figure 3.4.3 illustrates average work performance, including standard errors,
across treatments.18 Panel (a) of this figure shows that workers were about equally pro-
ductive under team incentives, irrespective of social interaction. A non-parametric test
cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal work performance (p = 0.90, Mann-Whitney
U).19
Figure 3.4: Impact of Social Interaction on Work Performance
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In order to analyze whether there is a short lived social interaction effect, we partition
the working time into 30-minute time periods, as shown in Figure 3.4.3. Panel (a) of
this figure visualizes the time course of work performance across the two team incentive
treatments. The figure indicates that work performance in both treatments is almost
identical over the entire working time. Another striking pattern is that both treatments
show a similar upward trend in work performance over time, suggesting that workers
gained experience in performing the task.
18Standard errors are clustered by worker pairs sharing the same office to account for dependence.
19We use average performance per office to use statistically independent observations. All p-values in
the analysis are two-sided.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of Social Interaction on Work Performance over Time
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To test these data patterns more formally and to control for observable differences in
worker characteristics and work conditions, we estimate a series of random effect models
of the following form
log(yikt) = αi + β0 + β1Si + β2Pt + β3Si × Pt + β4 log(Ai) + β5 ~Xi + ǫikt, (3.1)
where log(yikt) denotes the logarithm of the work performance of worker i in office k
and period t; αi is the individual random effect, the constant β0 captures average initial
performance in the omitted category, Si is a dummy indicating whether social interaction
with the team member was possible, Pt is a count variable for 30-minute periods ranging
from zero to seven, Si × Pt captures the interaction between social interaction and the
time trend, log(Ai) is the logarithm of the performance in the typing speed test, and
~Xi is a vector of control variables for worker characteristics (age and gender) and work
conditions (daytime, weekday, office, temperature, and sunshine hours); finally, ǫikt is the
idiosyncratic error term, which we allow to be correlated within worker pairs sharing the
same office.
Table 3.2 shows the coefficient estimates for equation (3.1). We find that social inter-
action had no effect on work performance under team incentives. The coefficients of both
social interaction and its interaction with the time trend are close to zero and therefore
insignificant in all columns. The coefficient of time period is consistently positive and
highly significant, suggesting a learning effect. Column (2) includes the performance in
the ability test as a control variable. Skills and work performance are strongly correlated:
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a 1 percent performance increase in the ability test was associated with a 0.6 percent
higher work performance. All estimates are robust to the inclusion of additional controls,
as shown in Column (3).
Table 3.2: Impact of Social Interaction on Work Performance under Team Incentives
Dependent variable:
Log(# characters) (1) (2) (3)
SOCIAL INTERACTION 0.014 0.046 0.054
(0.067) (0.050) (0.080)
Time period 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
SOCIAL INTERACTION × time period –0.008 –0.008 –0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(ability) 0.644*** 0.690***
(0.098) (0.104)
Constant (omitted: NO INTERACTION) 7.399*** 3.623*** 3.589***
(0.051) (0.578) (0.686)
Controls No No Yes
N 576 576 568a
Random effect model estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on worker pairs working in the
same office, in parentheses. Dependent variable: number of hourly characters from correct entries. a One
worker did not state her date of birth. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Result 1 Social interaction had no effect on work performance under team incentives.
Why did social interaction not foster cooperation when workers faced team incentives?
A plausible explanation is that workers internalized the positive externality even in the
absence of social interaction. To test this hypothesis, we use data from single workers
who were paid an individual piece rate of e 0.10 per entry. The only difference between
individual and team incentives is that the individual piece rate did not create an exter-
nality. Thus, if workers managed to internalize the positive externality, we should observe
a higher work performance under team than under individual incentives.
Table 3.3 reports coefficient estimates from a random effect model that compares the
work performance of single workers and the performance of those workers with team
incentives and who could not interact with their team member.20 Column (1) shows
20Because only 9 workers were subject to individual incentives, we do not have enough variation to
control for worker characteristics and work conditions in the regression analysis.
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that despite the lack of social interaction, work performance is 23 percent higher under
team than under individual incentives. This performance difference, however, drops to
10 percent and looses significance when we control for performance in the ability test, as
shown in Column (2).
Table 3.3: Individual vs. Team Incentives without Social Interaction
Dependent variable:
Log(# characters) (1) (2)
NO INTERACTION × TEAM INCENTIVES 0.232** 0.095
(0.098) (0.094)
Time period 0.028** 0.029**
(0.011) (0.011)
NO INTERACTION × TEAM INCENTIVES × time period 0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.013)
Log(ability) 0.784***
(0.097)
Constant (omitted: INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES) 7.168*** 2.704***
(0.083) (0.565)
Controls No No
N 355 355
Random effect model estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on worker pairs working in
the same office, in parentheses. Dependent variable: number of hourly characters from correct entries.
Sample: workers who were paid according to individual or team incentives. In case of team incentives,
team members worked in separate offices. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Result 2 Workers tended to internalize the positive externality even in the absence of
social interaction.
3.4.4 Social Interaction and Relative Incentives
We now analyze the impact of social interaction on work performance when relative
incentives were in place. Panel (b) of Figure 3.4.3 shows that social interaction was
detrimental to total work performance when effort imposed a negative externality. Social
interaction reduced work performance by an average of 17 percent, and this difference is
significant as indicated by a non-parametric test (p = 0.03, Mann-Whitney U).
We again used the partitioning of the work duration into 30-minute time periods in
order to examine how the treatment effect evolved over time. Panel (b) of Figure 3.4.3
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indicates that social interaction reduced work performance immediately, and that this
reduction persisted over the entire working time.
We complement this analysis and estimate a series of random effect models using
equation (3.1) for the sample of workers who faced relative incentives. All three model
specifications in Table 3.4 reveal that social interaction caused a significant drop in work
performance under relative incentives. The point estimate varies between –0.21 and –
0.28, meaning that initial work performance was between 21 and 28 percent lower in
the presence of social interaction. We only find a small and insignificant interaction
effect between social interaction and the time trend, indicating that the treatment effect
persisted over time. In addition, the temporal upward trend of work performance is
similar to the treatments with team incentives. Columns (2) and (3) add the performance
in the typing speed test as control variable. Skills are again strongly correlated with work
performance. The inclusion of additional controls, as shown in Column (3), does not
qualitatively change the insights gained from the baseline specification.
Table 3.4: Impact of Social Interaction on Work Performance under Relative Incentives
Dependent variable:
Log(# characters) (1) (2) (3)
SOCIAL INTERACTION –0.253*** –0.216** –0.304***
(0.096) (0.086) (0.076)
Time period 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
SOCIAL INTERACTION × time period 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log(ability) 0.597*** 0.512***
(0.127) (0.106)
Constant (omitted: NO INTERACTION) 7.464*** 3.954*** 2.094*
(0.057) (0.744) (1.097)
Controls No No Yes
N 591 591 591
Random effect model estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on worker pairs working in the
same office, in parentheses. Dependent variable: number of hourly characters from correct entries. Level
of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Result 3 Social interaction significantly reduced work performance under relative incen-
tives.
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These results are consistent with the notion that team members established implicit
collusive agreements to eliminate competition between them. A more direct test of col-
lision is to look whether within-team performance differences are smaller. We therefore
estimate a series of OLS regression models at the team level which are specified as follows
log(|yi − y−i|j) = γ0 + γ1Si + γ2 log(|Ai − A−i|j) + γ3Si × log(|Ai − A−i|j) + γ4 ~Xj + ǫj,
(3.2)
where log(|yi−y−i|j) denotes the logarithm of the absolute difference in work performance
between workers i and −i in team j, the constant γ0 captures average work performance
differences in the omitted category, Si is a dummy indicating whether social interaction
between team members was possible, log(|Ai − A−i|j) represents the logarithm of the
absolute performance difference in the ability test between workers i and −i in team j,
Si × log(|Ai − A−i|j) denotes the interaction between social interaction and the absolute
performance difference in the ability test, ~Xj is a vector of control variables for team
characteristics (mean age and gender) and work conditions (daytime, weekday, tempera-
ture, and sunshine hours); finally, ǫj is the idiosyncratic error term, which we allow to be
correlated within worker pairs sharing the same office.
Table 3.5 presents the coefficient estimates for equation (3.2). As shown in Column
(1), social interaction reduced within team-performance differences, but the coefficient
estimate is small and insignificant. A plausible explanation is that large ability differences
within teams made collusive agreements difficult to establish. This is because high-ability
workers could easily outperform their team member, and thus, had a higher temptation to
renege on collusive agreements. In order to analyze heterogeneity in the treatment effect,
we include an interaction term for within-team ability differences and social interaction
in Column (2). The coefficient of social interaction is now negative and significant. This
finding suggests that social interaction reduced within-team performance differences for
teams with homogeneous skills. By contrast, within-team performance differences increase
the more team members differed with respect to their skills, as indicated by a positive
and significant coefficient of the interaction term. The inclusion of additional controls, as
shown in Column (3), does not qualitatively change the results.
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Table 3.5: Performance Differences within Teams under Relative Incentives
Dependent variable:
Log(|∆ # characters|) (1) (2) (3)
SOCIAL INTERACTION -0.161 -2.721** -2.768**
(0.448) (1.280) (1.250)
Log(|∆ ability|) 0.166 -0.159 -0.182
(0.138) (0.228) (0.380)
SOCIAL INTERACTION× log(|∆ ability|) 0.592* 0.810**
(0.296) (0.348)
Constant (omitted: NO INTERACTION) 7.280*** 8.696*** 11.841
(0.572) (0.837) (11.828)
Controls No No Yes
N 37 37 37
OLS estimates. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on worker pairs working in the same office, in
parentheses. Dependent variable: absolute within-team difference of the number of hourly characters
from correct entries. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the heterogeneity in the treatment effect. The figure plots abso-
lute within-team performance differences both in the ability test and on the job. Team
members with similar skills had a more similar work performance in the presence of social
interaction, while the opposite is true for those who differed strongly with respect to their
skills.
Figure 3.6: Within-Team Performance and Ability Differences
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Result 4 Under relative incentives, social interaction significantly reduced within team-
performance differences for homogeneous teams, but did not promote collusion in hetero-
geneous teams.
3.5 Conclusion
We conducted a field experiment to examine the impact of social interaction on work
performance in the presence of either positive or negative effort externalities. We employed
workers to catalogue the books in a library. Hires were invited in groups of four and
randomly allocated to teams of two. The two team members were either assigned to work
in the same or a separate office. Social interaction between team members was thus only
possible if they shared the same office. Other peer effects, however, were kept constant
across treatments because workers always shared the office with another person. Workers
were then paid either according to team or relative incentives. Under team incentives,
workers’ effort imposed a positive externality on team member’s pay, while it imposed a
negative externality under relative incentives.
We show that social interaction had no impact on work performance under team
incentives. Further analysis reveals that workers internalized the positive externality
even without social interaction. By contrast, social interaction considerably reduced work
performance under relative incentives. We further find that social interaction significantly
lowered performance differences between team members with similar skills. Both findings
provide evidence that social interaction led to collusion when workers faced negative
externalities. However, we find that collusion was increasingly difficult the more team
members differed in skills. This result illustrates the limits of collusion.
An open question is whether side-payments would have allowed workers in heteroge-
neous teams to overcome their difficulty to collude. Workers with a lower ability than
their team member had more to gain from collusion and therefore could have compensated
their team member for forgone earnings. We only observe two cases of side-payments at
the end of work, and surprisingly, in the opposite direction: top performers of a team
offered to share part of their earnings with the slower team member. This observation
suggests that the motivation behind the side-payments were fairness concerns rather than
an attempt to sustain collusion.
If side-payments are nevertheless an issue, firms could theoretically set discriminatory
wages that inhibit the effectiveness of such transfers (Ishiguro, 2004). They could offer
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higher-powered incentives to the high-ability workers so that their foregone earnings of
collusion are too large to be compensated.
Finally, Becker and Sims (2001) show that office plans largely determine the intensity
of social interaction at the workplace. For example, open office designs were adopted to
maximize work-related communication between workers by removing the physical barriers
that hinder the workflow (Pile, 1976). Our results underscore the importance of taking
the particulars of office arrangements for the design of optimal incentive schemes into
account.
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Appendices
Appendix to Chapter 1
Treatment Postcards
Lieber Promoter, 
Ihr Standort ist für uns heute sehr wichtig. Gehen Sie bitte besonders
aktiv auf die Passanten zu. Dafür bezahlen wir Ihnen auch CHF 5.- mehr
pro Stunde.
Die exakte Anzahl der verteilten Zeitungen ist sehr wichtig. Behalten Sie einen
Bändel (1 Stapel = 100 Zeitungen) pro vollständig verteilten Stapel. Zählen Sie
zudem die verteilten Zeitungen des letzten, angefangenen Stapels. Schicken
Sie am Ende der Schicht ein Antwort-SMS mit Namen, Standort und
Gesamtzahl verteilter Zeitungen an 00447624802675.
Ihr heute-Team
Lieber Promoter, 
Die exakte Anzahl der verteilten Zeitungen ist sehr wichtig. Behalten Sie einen
Bändel (1 Stapel = 100 Zeitungen) pro vollständig verteilten Stapel. Zählen Sie
zudem die verteilten Zeitungen des letzten, angefangenen Stapels. Schicken
Sie am Ende der Schicht ein Antwort-SMS mit Namen, Standort und
Gesamtzahl verteilter Zeitungen an 00447624802675.
Ihr heute-Team
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Feedback Form
Heute... das Neuste am Abend – PROMOTOREN - FEEDBACK 
Lieber Promotor  
Herzlichen Dank für Deinen Einsatz an der Promotion für heute. Zum Abschluss dieser Aktion möchten wir gerne Dein Feedback dazu 
haben. Bitte sende uns dieses ausgefüllte Feedbackblatt bis spätestens 29.  September 2006 zu. 
Die Bezahlung von CHF 22.-/Stunde für diese Tätigkeit empfand ich als … 
     
knauserig  angemessen  grosszügig 
Das genaue Zählen der Anzahl verteilter heute-Zeitungen empfand ich als … 
     
nicht anstrengend  anstrengend  sehr anstrengend 
Die Spezialaufgabe (besonders aktiv auf Leute zuzugehen) empfand ich als …  
     
nicht anstrengend  anstrengend  sehr anstrengend 
Die Lohnerhöhung von CHF 5.-/Stunde für die Spezialaufgabe empfand ich als … 
     
unangemessen  fair  grosszügig 
Wie häufig möchtest Du weiter für [Firma] im Einsatz stehen? 
     
nicht mehr 
nur abends nach 17.00 
Uhr 
am Wochenende MO-FR unter der Woche auf Anfrage 
Welche Nationalität hast du?  _____________________________________________ 
Arbeitsbewilligung:  
Haben Freunde von dir bei der heute-Promotion mitgearbeitet? Falls Ja, zähle diese der Reihe nach auf (1 = bester Freund, 2 = zweit-
bester Freund etc.) 
1 _______________________ 
2 _______________________ 
3 _______________________ 
4 _______________________ 
5 _______________________ 
6 _______________________ 
7 _______________________ 
Allgemeine Beobachtungen und Kommentare: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 B  C  L  Andere: ______________
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Follow-Up Survey
Universität Zürich 
Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung 
 
 
 
 
17. Oktober 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wissenschaftliche Studie über Teilzeitbeschäftigung in der Schweiz 
            
 
[Anrede] 
 
Mit freundlicher Genehmigung der [Firma] wurden Sie von der Universität Zürich zusammen mit vielen 
anderen Teilzeitbeschäftigten aus der Schweiz ausgewählt, um an einer wissenschaftlichen Studie teilzuneh-
men. Die Studie besteht aus einem Entscheidungsteil (gelbe Blätter) – hier können Sie Entscheidungen tref-
fen – und einem Fragebogen (rosa Blätter). Durch Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Studie helfen Sie uns, die 
Situation von Teilzeitbeschäftigten besser zu verstehen. Wir bitten Sie deshalb, an dieser Studie teilzu-
nehmen. Ausserdem können Sie durch Ihre Teilnahme an dieser Studie – das sorgfältige und voll-
ständige Ausfüllen des Entscheidungsteils und des Fragebogens – bis zu 25 Franken verdienen. 
 
Lesen Sie deshalb bitte als erstes die Beschreibung des Entscheidungsteils auf den Seiten 2 bis 4 durch. Fül-
len Sie anschliessend die gelben Entscheidungsblätter und den rosa Fragebogen aus. Zum Schluss stecken 
Sie bitte die Entscheidungsblätter und den Fragebogen in den bereits frankierten Antwort-Umschlag und 
schicken es bis Montag 30. Oktober 2006 (Poststempel) an uns zurück. 
 
Sobald wir Ihren Antwort-Umschlag (mit Entscheidungsblättern und Fragebogen) fristgerecht erhalten ha-
ben, schicken wir Ihnen per Post den Geldbetrag, den Sie verdient haben, in bar zu. Alle Daten werden 
ausschliesslich für wissenschaftliche Zwecke verwendet und nur in anonymisierter Form ausgewertet. Wir 
garantieren Ihnen, dass niemand, weder die [Firma] noch irgendwelche andere Firmen, Zugang zu diesen 
Daten erhalten. 
 
Falls Sie Fragen zur Studie haben (z.B. zum Ausfüllen der Entscheidungsblätter), erteilen wir Ihnen gerne 
Auskunft unter der Telefonnummer [Telefonnummer], oder schreiben Sie uns eine E-Mail [E-Mail]. 
 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!      
 
Mit freundlichen Grüssen 
        Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung 
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IHRE ENTSCHEIDUNGSSITUATION 
 
A. WORUM GEHT ES? 
 
Es geht in dieser Studie um die Aufteilung eines Geldbetrages zwischen 2 Personen und um das Be-
lohnen und Bestrafen. Sie sind in dieser Studie mit einer zufällig ausgewählten anderen Person zusam-
men in einer Zweiergruppe.  
Zuerst muss die andere Person entscheiden, wie sie einen Geldbetrag von 24 Franken zwischen Ihnen bei-
den aufteilt. Dann haben Sie die Möglichkeit, die Entscheidung der anderen Person zu bewerten, indem Sie 
der anderen Person Bonuspunkte oder Minuspunkte zuweisen. Sie können aber auch gar keine Punkte zu-
weisen.  
Wir garantieren die Anonymität aller Entscheidungen. Das bedeutet, dass Sie die Identität der anderen Per-
son nie erfahren. Diese erfährt auch nie etwas über Ihre Identität. Wir garantieren auch dafür, dass alle 
Geldbeträge, die aufgrund der Entscheidungen verdient werden, an Sie und die andere Person ausbezahlt 
werden.  
 
Wie kann die andere Person die 24 Franken aufteilen? 
Die andere Person hat 3 verschiedene Möglichkeiten, die 24 Franken aufzuteilen. Sie kann 
 
 18 Franken für sich selbst behalten und Ihnen 6 Franken geben, oder 
 12 Franken für sich selbst behalten und Ihnen 12 Franken geben, oder  
 6 Franken für sich selbst behalten und Ihnen 18 Franken geben. 
 
 
Worüber können Sie entscheiden? 
Sie können der anderen Person bis zu 2 Bonus- oder Minuspunkte zuweisen, oder Sie können nichts 
unternehmen, d.h. keine Punkte zuweisen.  
 
Bonuspunkte: Jeder Bonuspunkt den Sie der anderen Person zuweisen, erhöht deren Auszahlung – rela-
tiv zum Aufteilungsvorschlag – um 6 Franken und kostet Sie 2 Franken. Wenn Sie also 
beispielsweise 2 Bonuspunkte zuweisen, dann erhöht sich die Auszahlung der anderen 
Person um 12 Franken und es kostet Sie 4 Franken. Mit Bonuspunkten können Sie also 
die andere Person belohnen. 
 
Minuspunkte: Jeder Minuspunkt den Sie der anderen Person zuweisen, verringert deren Auszahlung – 
relativ zum Aufteilungsvorschlag – um 6 Franken und kostet Sie 2 Franken. Wenn Sie al-
so beispielsweise 2 Minuspunkte zuweisen, dann verringert sich die Auszahlung der ande-
ren Person um 12 Franken und es kostet Sie 4 Franken. Mit Minuspunkten können sie al-
so die andere Person bestrafen. 
 
Keine Punkte: In diesem Fall erhält die andere Person keine Bonus- und keine Minuspunkte. Sie und die 
andere Person verdienen dann soviel wie im Aufteilungsvorschlag vorgesehen ist.  
 
Durch die Vergabe von Bonus- oder Minuspunkten können Sie also die Auszahlungen - relativ zum Auftei-
lungsvorschlag – verändern. Wenn Sie keine Punkte zuweisen, werden die Auszahlungen nicht verändert.  
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B. EIN PAAR BEISPIELE  
 
Hier finden Sie noch ein paar Beispiele zur Berechnung der Geldbeträge. 
 
 
Beispiel 1: Die andere Person behält 18 Franken für sich selbst und gibt Ihnen 6 Franken. 
 
 Wenn Sie dann der anderen Person beispielsweise 2 Minuspunkte zuweisen, dann verringert dies die 
Auszahlung der anderen Person um 12 Franken und es kostet Sie 4 Franken. 
Die andere Person hat jetzt neu 18 – 12 = 6 Franken und Sie verdienen 6 – 4 = 2 Franken. 
 
 Wenn Sie hingegen der anderen Person beispielsweise 2 Bonuspunkte zuweisen, dann erhöht dies die 
Auszahlung der anderen Person um 12 Franken und kostet Sie 4 Franken. 
Die andere Person hat jetzt neu 18 + 12 = 30 Franken und Sie verdienen 6 – 4 = 2 Franken.  
 
 Wenn Sie keine Punkte vergeben, dann erhält die andere Person 18 Franken und Sie verdienen 6 Fran-
ken. 
 
 
Beispiel 2: Die andere Person behält 6 Franken für sich selbst und gibt Ihnen 18 Franken. 
 
 Wenn Sie dann der anderen Person beispielsweise 1 Bonuspunkt zuweisen, dann erhöht dies die Aus-
zahlung der anderen Person um 6 Franken und kostet Sie 2 Franken. 
Die andere Person hat jetzt neu 6 + 6 = 12 Franken und Sie verdienen 18 – 2 = 16 Franken.  
 
 Wenn Sie hingegen der anderen Person beispielsweise 1 Minuspunkt zuweisen, dann verringert dies die 
Auszahlung der anderen Person um 6 Franken und kostet Sie 2 Franken. 
Die andere Person hat jetzt neu 6 – 6 = 0 Franken und Sie verdienen 18 – 2 = 16 Franken. 
 
 Wenn Sie keine Punkte vergeben, dann erhält die andere Person 6 Franken und Sie verdienen 18 Fran-
ken. 
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C. DER GENAUE ABLAUF DER EREIGNISSE 
 
Wir bitten Sie, für alle 3 möglichen Aufteilungen, welche die andere Person vorschlagen kann, festzule-
gen, wie viel Bonus- bzw. Minuspunkte Sie vergeben oder ob Sie keine Punkte vergeben. Sie müssen 
also für jeden der drei folgenden Fälle eine Entscheidung treffen: 
 
 
 Fall 1: Die andere Person behält 18 Franken für sich selbst und gibt Ihnen 6 Franken  
 Fall 2: Die andere Person behält 12 Franken für sich selbst und gibt Ihnen 12 Franken 
 Fall 3: Die andere Person behält 6 Franken für sich selbst und gibt Ihnen 18 Franken 
 
 
Welcher Fall für die Auszahlung relevant ist, hängt von der Entscheidung der anderen Person ab. Die Un-
terlagen für diese Studie werden an viele Person versandt und deshalb wissen wir derzeit noch nicht, welche 
Entscheidung die andere Person getroffen hat. Wenn aber die andere Person beispielsweise 12 Franken für 
sich selbst nimmt und 12 Franken an sie gibt, dann ist Fall 2 relevant.  
 
Beachten Sie, dass es bei dieser Entscheidungssituation keine richtigen oder falschen Entscheide gibt. Für 
uns ist es wichtig, dass Sie Ihre Entscheidungen und Antworten vollständig und sorgfältig treffen. Bitte tref-
fen Sie Ihre Entscheide alleine und besprechen Sie sich nicht mit anderen Personen, z.B. Freunden. Ihre 
Anonymität bleibt vollständig gewahrt. 
 
 
D. HINWEISE 
 
Wie setzt sich Ihr Gesamteinkommen aus dieser Studie zusammen? 
 
Das Gesamteinkommen setzt sich einmal aus  
(1) dem Einkommen aus dem Entscheidungsteil (bis zu 18 Franken) und  
(2) einem Fixbetrag von 7 Franken für das vollständige Ausfüllen des Fragebogens zusammen. 
 
 
Wie bekommen Sie Ihr Geld? 
Sobald wir die Antwort-Umschläge von den Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer erhalten haben, werden die 
Einkommen berechnet. Sie erhalten von uns das verdiente Geld per Post in bar zugesandt.  
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ENTSCHEIDUNGSBLATT FÜR DEN FALL 1 
 
 
Ihre Entscheidung für den Fall 1: 
Die andere Person behält 18 Franken für sich selbst und gibt Ihnen 6 Franken. 
 
 
Für diesen Fall vergebe ich folgende Punkte: 
(Bitte kreuzen Sie eines der unten angegebenen Kästchen an) 
 
2 Minuspunkte. 
 
 !
 
 
1 Minuspunkt. 
 
 !
 
0 Punkte. 
 
 !
 
1 Bonuspunkt. 
 
 !
 
2 Bonuspunkte. 
 
 !
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ENTSCHEIDUNGSBLATT FÜR DEN FALL 2 
 
 
Ihre Entscheidung für den Fall 2: 
Die andere Person behält 12 Franken für sich selbst und gibt Ihnen 12 Franken.
 
 
Für diesen Fall vergebe ich folgende Punkte: 
(Bitte kreuzen Sie eines der unten angegebenen Kästchen an) 
 
2 Minuspunkte. 
 
 !
 
 
1 Minuspunkt. 
 
 !
 
0 Punkte. 
 
 !
 
1 Bonuspunkt. 
 
 !
 
2 Bonuspunkte. 
 
 !
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ENTSCHEIDUNGSBLATT FÜR DEN FALL 3 
 
 
Ihre Entscheidung für den Fall 3: 
Die andere Person behält 6 Franken für sich selbst und gibt Ihnen 18 Franken. 
 
 
Für diesen Fall vergebe ich folgende Punkte: 
(Bitte kreuzen Sie eines der unten angegebenen Kästchen an) 
 
2 Minuspunkte. 
 
 !
 
 
1 Minuspunkt. 
 
 !
 
0 Punkte. 
 
 !
 
1 Bonuspunkt. 
 
 !
 
2 Bonuspunkte. 
 
 !
 
 
 
 
 
Haben Sie für alle 3 möglichen Aufteilungsvorschläge je ein Kästchen angekreuzt? 
 
Dann geben Sie bitte in wenigen Stichworten an, welche Überlegungen hinter Ihren Entscheiden standen. 
 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
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FRAGEBOGEN 
 
Zehn Fragen zu Ihrer Teilzeitarbeit im letzten halben Jahr. 
 
Bitte beantworten Sie die unten stehenden Fragen in Bezug auf Ihre Teilzeitjobs im letzten Jahr. Haben 
Sie mehr wie drei Arbeitsverhältnisse ausgeübt, bitten wir Sie die Fragen in Hinsicht auf die 3 wichtigsten 
Arbeitsverhältnisse zu beantworten. Bei weniger wie drei Arbeitsverhältnissen können Sie die entsprechen-
den Felder für Arbeitgeber 2, respektive Arbeitgeber 3, leer lassen.   
 
 
1) Nennen Sie Ihre Teilzeit-Arbeitgeber im letzten halben Jahr. 
 
Arbeitgeber 1 [Firma] _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. 
Arbeitgeber 2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. 
Arbeitgeber 3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. 
 
 
2) Welche Tätigkeiten haben Sie ausgeübt? 
 
Bei Arbeitgeber 1 habe ich als _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ gearbeitet. 
Bei Arbeitgeber 2 habe ich als _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ gearbeitet. 
Bei Arbeitgeber 3 habe ich als _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ gearbeitet. 
 
 
3) Wie viele Stunden haben Sie pro Woche beim jeweiligen Arbeitgeber gearbeitet? 
 
Bei Arbeitgeber 1 habe ich _ _ _ _ _ Stunden pro Woche gearbeitet. 
Bei Arbeitgeber 2 habe ich _ _ _ _ _ Stunden pro Woche gearbeitet. 
Bei Arbeitgeber 3 habe ich _ _ _ _ _ Stunden pro Woche gearbeitet. 
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4) Wie viele Monate möchten Sie noch für Ihre derzeitigen Teilzeit-Arbeitgeber arbeiten?  
 
Bei Arbeitgeber 1 möchte ich noch _ _ _ _ _ Monate weiterarbeiten. 
Bei Arbeitgeber 2 möchte ich noch _ _ _ _ _ Monate weiterarbeiten. 
Bei Arbeitgeber 3 möchte ich noch _ _ _ _ _ Monate weiterarbeiten. 
 
 
5) Wie viel haben Sie brutto pro Stunde verdient? 
 
Bei Arbeitgeber 1 habe ich _ _ _ _ _ Franken pro Stunde verdient. 
Bei Arbeitgeber 2 habe ich _ _ _ _ _ Franken pro Stunde verdient. 
Bei Arbeitgeber 3 habe ich _ _ _ _ _ Franken pro Stunde verdient. 
 
 
6) Wie viel (in brutto pro Stunde) halten Sie für angemessen für die Ausübung Ihrer Tätigkeiten?  
 
Für die Ausübung der Tätigkeit bei Arbeitgeber 1 halte ich _ _ _ _ _ Franken pro Stunde für angemessen. 
Für die Ausübung der Tätigkeit bei Arbeitgeber 2 halte ich _ _ _ _ _ Franken pro Stunde für angemessen. 
Für die Ausübung der Tätigkeit bei Arbeitgeber 3 halte ich _ _ _ _ _ Franken pro Stunde für angemessen. 
 
 
7) Finden Sie Ihre Teilzeitarbeiten sinnstiftend und erfüllend oder eher frustrierend? 
 
 Sehr  
frustrierend 
Eher 
frustrierend
Weder noch
Etwas 
erfüllend
Sehr 
erfüllend
Arbeitgeber 1           
Arbeitgeber 2           
Arbeitgeber 3           
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8) Wie stark fühlen sie sich mit Ihren Arbeitgebern verbunden? 
 
 Sehr schwach Eher schwach Weder noch Eher stark Sehr stark 
Arbeitgeber 1           
Arbeitgeber 2           
Arbeitgeber 3           
 
 
9) Fühlten Sie sich in Ihren Teilzeitjobs gefordert? 
 
 Stark  
unterfordert 
Eher  
unterfordert
Weder noch
Eher  
gefordert
Stark  
gefordert
Arbeitgeber 1           
Arbeitgeber 2           
Arbeitgeber 3           
 
 
10) Allgemein gesprochen, wie schwierig war es für Sie, eine Teilzeitstelle zu erhalten? 
 
Sehr schwierig Eher schwierig Weder noch Etwas einfach Sehr einfach 
       
 
78
Universität Zürich 
Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung 
Zuletzt noch einige Fragen zu Ihrer Person. 
 
 
In welchem Jahr sind Sie geboren?  _ _ _ _  
 
Was ist Ihr Geschlecht?      Männlich     Weiblich 
 
Sind Sie in der Schweiz geboren?     Ja      Nein 
 
Falls nicht, wie lange leben Sie schon in der Schweiz? 
 
Ich lebe schon seit _ _ _ _ _  Jahren in der Schweiz. 
 
Wie viele Geschwister haben Sie? 
 
Ich habe _ _ _ _ _  Geschwister. 
 
Über welche abgeschlossenen Schulbildungen verfügen Sie? Bitte geben Sie alle abgeschlossenen Schulbil-
dungen an. 
 
  Primarschule / Volksschule  Gymnasium 
  Sekundarschule / Real  Fachhochschule
  Lehre / Berufsschule  Universität 
  Weiter- / Zweitausbildung   
 
Falls Ihre Schulbildung noch nicht abgeschlossen ist, geben Sie bitte zusätzlich an, welcher Ihr nächster 
Abschluss sein wird.  
 
  Primarschule / Volksschule  Gymnasium
  Sekundarschule / Real  Fachhochschule 
  Lehre / Berufsschule  Universität 
  Weiter- / Zweitausbildung  Keine
 
 
 
 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme 
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A Model of Social Comparison
The standard economic model ignores fairness motives and social comparison because it
assumes that individuals exclusively pursue their own material interest. Consequently,
neither the level of the own flat wage nor the level of coworker wages has an impact on
effort in the absence of reputation incentives because material work incentives are identical
in each case.
The model of inequity aversion developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), however, takes
fairness and social comparison into account and provides a micro-foundation of the fair
wage-effort hypothesis. Specifically, the level of the flat wage determines firm and worker
payoffs and thus influences inequity between the involved parties. An inequity averse
worker therefore has an incentive to minimize this inequity by choosing a specific level of
effort.
In our setup, a firm employs two identical workers, worker 1 and worker 2. We analyze
worker i’s effort ei in response to the wages wi and wj set by the firm, and to coworker
effort ej. Let the firm’s payoff from worker i be the revenue generated by worker i minus
wage cost:
πi = vei − wi, i ∈ {1, 2}, ei, wi ≥ 0.
Let worker i’s payoff be her wage minus her effort cost:
xi = wi − cei, 0 < c < v,
and let worker i’s utility be the sum of her payoff xi, her disutility from inequity with
respect to the firm, and her disutility from inequity with respect to her coworker j:
Ui = xi −
α
2
max{πi − xi, 0} −
β
2
max{xi − πi, 0}
−
α
2
max{xj − xi, 0} −
β
2
max{xi − xj, 0}
with the assumption that β ≤ α and 0 ≤ β < 1. The parameter α measures how
much the worker dislikes disadvantageous inequity and β measures how much she dislikes
advantageous inequity.21
21When α, β = 0, the worker only cares about her own payoff, which corresponds to the standard
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Effort is not contractible, thus the only reason why a worker should exert effort is to
reduce inequity. Consider first inequity between one worker and the firm:
|xi − πi| = |2wi − (c+ v)ei|.
If the worker does not provide effort, i.e. ei = 0, she creates inequity to her advantage of
xi − πi = 2wi. If she works, she will reduce her own payoff but at the same time increase
the firm’s payoff. One unit of effort decreases inequity with respect to the firm by c + v
units. For any wage wi, the level of effort that equalizes worker and firm payoff is:
exi=piii (wi) =
2
c+ v
wi ≡ e
F (wi).
Consider now inequity between worker and coworker. Inequity in relation to the coworker
depends on the wages and effort levels of both workers:
|xi − xj| = |wi − wj − c(ei − ej)|.
Hence, in contrast to worker-firm inequity, one unit of effort changes inequity in relation
to the coworker by only c units because own effort does not affect coworker payoff. For
wage levels wi and wj, and coworker effort ej, the level of own effort that equalizes worker
and coworker payoff is:
e
xi=xj
i (wi, wj, ej) = ej +
wi − wj
c
≡ eC .
In particular, worker payoffs are equalized for equal wages if and only if they exert the
same amount of effort.
We now analyze a worker’s effort choice for different values of α and β. First, if a
worker does not suffer enough from advantageous inequity (i.e., for β below a threshold
β), she will never exert effort. In other words, marginal utility from inequity reduction
with respect to both firm and coworker is lower than marginal cost of effort:
β
2
(c+ v) +
β
2
< c, xi ≥ πi.
economic model.
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This is equivalent to a low value of β:
β <
2c
2c+ v
≡ β.
Second, if a worker suffers much from advantageous inequity with respect to the firm, and
not too much from disadvantageous inequity with respect to her coworker, she will always
exert effort, no matter how much effort her coworker exerts:
β
2
(c+ v)−
α
2
c > c, xi ≥ πi.
This corresponds to a low value of α and high value of β:
α < β
c+ c
v
− 2 ≡ α¯
Hence, a worker with these inequity parameters will increase effort as long as her payoff
is greater than the firm’s payoff. However, no worker ever exerts more effort than the
level that equalizes worker and firm payoff, i.e., ei = e
F , even if thereby she could reduce
advantageous inequity with respect to her coworker. This is because marginal cost from
increased disadvantageous inequity with respect to the firm always outweighs marginal
gain from inequity reduction with respect to the coworker:
−
α
2
(c+ v) +
β
2
c < 0.
As a result, a worker with a low α and high β will always equalize payoffs with the firm
by exerting eF .
Third, if a worker suffers much from both advantageous inequity with respect to the
firm and disadvantageous inequity with respect to her coworker, she would like to decrease
inequity with respect to the firm because β > β, but she is not willing to incur a lower
payoff than her coworker because α > α¯. Thus, if both α and β are high, she will always
equalize payoffs with her coworker rather than with the firm by choosing effort level eC .
Now we can characterize the three sets of Nash equilibrium strategies for worker 1 and
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worker 2 as a function of α and β:
(i) β < β : e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 0
(ii) β ≥ β, α < α¯ : e∗1 = e
F (wi), e
∗
2 = e
F (wj)
(iii) β ≥ β, α ≥ α¯ : e∗1 = e1, e
∗
2 = e1 +
w2 − w1
c
, e1, e2 ∈ [0, eF ]
Now suppose that the wage can take on two levels, H and L, with H − L = ∆ > 0.
Consider the situation where both workers earn the high wage H. In case (i), workers
provide zero effort in equilibrium. In case (ii), they provide positive effort eF (H) = 2
c+v
H.
In case (iii), any effort level between 0 and eF (H) that both workers choose is a Nash
equilibrium. However, if we assume that workers are able to coordinate on the coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium, only two equilibria remain. These two equilibria again depend
on the value of β. If β is below a threshold β¯, workers care little about advantageous
inequity with respect to the firm and coordinate on a effort level of 0. Conversely, if β is
greater than β¯, workers care much about inequity with respect to the firm and coordinate
on eF (H):
(iii.a) α ≥ α¯, β ≤ β <
2c
c+ v
≡ β¯ : e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 0
(iii.b) α ≥ α¯, β ≥ β¯ : e∗1 = e
∗
2 = e
F (H)
Panel (a) of Figure A shows the equilibrium effort levels if both workers earn the high
wage.
The situation where both workers earn the low wage L is analogous to the situation
above (see Panel (b) of Figure A). Thus, depending on the values of the inequity pa-
rameters, workers choose either e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 0 or e
∗
1 = e
∗
2 = e
F (L). In the latter case, a
lower wage implies a lower effort level, i.e., eF (L) = eF (H) − 2∆
c+v
< eF (H) because the
firm-equalizing effort level eF = 2
c+v
w w is proportional to the wage.
Now consider the situation where worker 1 earns the high wage H and worker 2 the low
wage L (see Panel (c) and (d) of Figure A). In case (i), where workers do not suffer much
from inequity, equilibrium effort is 0 for both workers. In case (ii), where workers equalize
their respective payoffs with the firm, equilibrium effort is eF (H) for worker 1, and eF (L)
for worker 2. In case (iii), workers equalize their payoffs with each other. In case (iii.a),
worker 1 has to choose a positive effort because worker 2 cannot provide negative effort.
Worker 1 therefore chooses effort e˜1 =
∆
c
unless this value exceeds eF (H), in which case
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Figure A: Equilibrium effort levels for the four treatment groups
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she chooses eF (H). In case (iii.b), worker 1 chooses eF (H). She is not willing to provide
more effort than eF (H) because the utility gain from inequity reduction with respect to
the coworker would always be lower than the associated effort cost. Thus, in order to
equalize worker payoffs, worker 2 chooses e˜2 = e
F (H)− ∆
c
unless this value is negative, in
which case she chooses 0.
Effort e˜2 is lower than e
F (L) because worker 2 can influence the payoff of the firm
but not her coworker’s payoff. As can be seen in Figure B, worker 2 has to reduce effort
from eF (H) to eF (L) to eliminate 2∆ units of inequity with respect to the firm. The
corresponding difference in effort is 2∆
c+v
units because reducing effort by one unit not only
increases own payoff by c units but also reduces firm payoff by v units. In contrast, to
eliminate ∆ units of inequity with respect to the coworker, worker 2 has to reduce effort by
∆
c
units because reducing effort by one unit increases own payoff by c but leaves coworker
payoff unaffected. Because marginal product of effort v is greater than marginal cost of
effort c, e˜2 is lower than e
F (L).
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Figure B: Payoffs as Functions of Effort
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We now derive the hypotheses for the change in effort from pre- to post-intervention
period across treatments:22
Hypothesis 1 (Treatment LL)
1a If β < β or β < β¯, α ≥ α¯: both workers’ equilibrium effort levels remain constant.
1b Otherwise: both workers’ equilibrium effort levels decrease.
Hypothesis 2 (Treatment Group HL2)
2a If β < β or β < β¯, α ≥ α¯: worker 2’s equilibrium effort level remains constant.
2b Otherwise: worker 2’s equilibrium effort level decreases.
2b’ If β ≥ β, α < α¯: worker 2’s equilibrium effort level is the same as in LL.
2b” If β ≥ β, α ≥ α¯: worker 2’s equilibrium effort level is lower as in LL.
Hypothesis 3 (Treatment Group HL1)
3a If α < α¯ or β < β or β ≥ β¯, α ≥ α¯: worker 1’s equilibrium effort level remains
constant.
3b Otherwise: worker 1’s equilibrium effort level increases.
22Treatment HH equilibrium effort levels are the same as pre-intervention period equilibrium effort
levels because both workers continue to earn the high wage.
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Procedural Instructions for Workers and Team Leaders23
 
Nachtausgabe GmbH 
Handbuch für 
Teamleiter (TL) / Promoter 
Stand: 01. Dezember 2008 
23I merged the instructions for the workers and team leaders and denoted sections that were accessible
to only one party accordingly.
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 1. Das Unternehmen 
Das Unternehmen Nachtausgabe GmbH wurde im Oktober 1999 gegründet. Das Ziel des 
Unternehmens ist es, Endverbrauchern sehr attraktive Ersparnisse in ihrer Freizeit zu ermöglichen 
und zugleich den teilnehmenden Partnerunternehmen einen Zugewinn durch unsere Tätigkeit zu 
ermöglichen. 
Nachtausgabe.de ist ein Netzwerk über das Angebote zu Veranstaltungen in ganz Deutschland 
offeriert werden. Darüber hinaus bietet es alles was eine gute Community-Seite auszeichnet.  
2. Aktion „Nachtluft schnuppern“ 
Die Aktion „Nachtluft schnuppern“ findet parallel in Hamburg und Berlin in der Zeit 
vom 16. Januar bis 24. Januar 2009
statt. 
Ziel dieser Aktion ist es Menschen zwischen 18 und 30 Jahren auf unsere Internetpräsenz 
www.nachtausgabe.de aufmerksam zu machen und neue User zu gewinnen. Um es interessant zu 
gestalten gibt es diese Aktion. 
Nachtluft kombiniert Clubangebote der Städte mit Angeboten von Freizeit- / Lifestyle-Partnern 
der Region. 
Um diese Angebote wahrnehmen zu können erhalten Interessierte (= Kunden) über Promotion-
Teams und über Online Bestellung 1 Ticket, welches für ALLE Veranstaltungen gilt – Das 
Nachtluft-Ticket.
Durch Vorzeigen bei unseren Partnern erhält der Kunde die ausgewiesenen Vergünstigungen. Für 
die Aktion „Nachtluft schnuppern“ findet auch ein Gewinnspiel statt. Dafür registrieren sich 
Kunden durch ausfüllen des Flyers auf Promotion und erhalten zugleich 2 Tickets kostenlos. 
Für den regulären Preis von 5,-€ bekommt der Kunde auch 2 Tickets. 
3. Angebote von Nachtluft 
ClubPartnerangebote
Angebote der teilnehmenden Clubs und Diskotheken sind verschieden. 
Alle Angebote befinden sich auf unserer Homepage: www.nachtausgabe.de/nachtluft. Die 
Internetseite ist für alle kostenlos. Eine beispielhafte Zusammenstellung ist der Flyer. Er 
beinhaltet aus Platzgründen nicht alle Angebote.  
Beispiele für Clubangebote: kostenloser Eintritt oder Freigetränke. 
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 LifestylePartner-Angebote
In dieser Rubrik befinden sich hauptsächlich Dienstleistungen rund ums Thema Freizeit, Spaß 
und Spiel. Alle Angebote mit Beschreibung der Anbieter befinden sich auf unserer Homepage: 
www.nachtausgabe.de/nachtluft.
Beispiele für Lifestyle-Angebote: Rabatte, kostenlose Proben, 2für1-Angebote 
Voting/Competition
Jeder Kunde kann sich auf unserer Homepage anmelden und Bilder online stellen. Mit diesen 
Bildern kann er an einem Voting teilnehmen, welches jeder Online-Besucher von 
Nachtausgabe.de beeinflussen kann. Hierbei wird „Das Gesicht von Nachtluft“ gesucht. Es ist 
sehr kreativ angelegt, so dass jeder Kunde darauf hingewiesen werden sollte. Nach Möglichkeit 
werden auf unseren Promotion erste Bilder von Kunden gemacht und online gestellt. Auf den 
Gewinner der Competition warten tolle Gewinne. 
Gewinnspiel
Am Gewinnspiel nehmen alle Personen teil, die über Promotion den Flyer vollständig ausgefüllt 
haben. Die Gewinnspielauswertung findet nach Abschluss der Veranstaltung statt. Gewinner 
werden angeschrieben und auf www.nachtausgabe.de veröffentlicht. Alle Gewinne sind auf 
unserer Internetpräsenz angegeben. Gewinne sind z.B. ein Partygutschein und Sachpreise. 
4. Promotionablauf 
Street- und Clubpromotion dauern jeweils 3 Stunden. Es gibt keine Verlängerung oder 
vorzeitigen Abbruch. Die Streetpromotion findet immer in den Zeiten zwischen 17.00 Uhr - 
20.00 Uhr an Hotspots der Stadt statt und die Clubpromotion  zwischen 23.00 Uhr - 02.00 Uhr in 
Clubs und Diskotheken. (In Hamburg nach Absprache) 
Zeitgleich sind Teams im Aktionsraum Berlin und Hamburg im Einsatz. 
Jeder Teamleiter (TL) betreut zwei Teams, jedes Team besteht aus zwei Promotern. Der TL ist 
für Fragen aller Art der Ansprechpartner. 
Vorbereitung (TL)
Einige Tage vor Start der ersten Promotion erhalten Teamleiter die Einsatzpläne, Materialien 
und Kleidung für alle Promotionen im Dezember-Block. Das beinhaltet: Flyer, Tickets, 
Datenblätter zur Abrechnung, Klemmbretter, Brustbeutel, Hüfttaschen, Schlüsselbänder, TL-
Tasche, Kugelschreiber, T-Shirts und Windbreaker. 
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 Ausstattung/Stück (TL):
Jeder Street-Promoter erhält: 
- 1x Windbreaker, gelb 
- 1x Klemmbrett 
- 1x Schlüsselband, nachtausgabe 
- 1x Brustbeutel, schwarz 
- 1x Hüfttasche, schwarz 
- 2x Kugelschreiber 
- 100 Tickets 
- 120 Flyer 
- 5 Datenblätter–Adresse 
- 1x CashListe 
Jeder Club-Promoter erhält: 
- 1x T-Shirt, gelb 
- 1x Klemmbrett 
- 1x Schlüsselband, nachtausgabe 
- 1x Brustbeutel, schwarz 
- 1x Hüfttasche, schwarz 
- 2x Kugelschreiber 
- 100 Tickets 
- 100 Flyer 
- 5 Datenblätter–Adresse 
- 1x CashListe 
Reserven und TL-Ausstattung:
- 1x TL-Tasche, schwarz 
- 2x Jacken (für jedes Team stehen die gleichen 3 Größen zur Verfügung, die 
jeweils nicht genutzte verbleibt) 
- 1x Klemmbrett 
- 2x Schlüsselband 
- 2x Brustbeutel 
- 1x Hüfttasche 
- 5x Kugelschreiber 
- restl. Tickets (von Ausgang 3000) 
- restl. Flyer (von Ausgang 3000) 
- Datenblätter  
1. Streetpromotionbereiche 
2. Adressenblätter
3. Promoterprotokoll 
4. Teamleiterprotokoll 
Anmeldung:  TLs werden die generierten Daten der Promotion in unsere OnlineDatenbank 
eintragen. Dazu ist erforderlich, dass sich jeder zuvor auf www.nachtausgabe.de einen Account 
anlegt und seinen User-Namen dem NA-Büro Berlin mitteilt. Damit kann dann die Freischaltung 
erfolgen. 
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 Die Einteilung in Verdienstgruppen (TL)
Die Universität Zürich führt im Rahmen der Nachtluft-Aktion eine wissenschaftliche Studie 
durch.
Jedes Promoterteam besteht aus einem „1“-Promoter und einem „2“-Promoter. Diese Aufteilung 
hat nichts mit der Tätigkeit der Promoter zu tun, diese ist für beide Promoter identisch! Jedoch 
hat die Aufteilung in „1“- und „2“-Promoter einen Einfluss auf den Verdienst der Promoter. 
In der ersten Woche (d.h. FR / SA in Woche 1) verdienen ALLE Promoter (d.h. sowohl „1“-
Promoter als auch „2“-Promoter) 12 € anstelle der vertraglich vereinbarten 10 € pro Stunde. 
In der zweiten Woche (d.h. FR / SA in Woche 2) werden die Promoterteams in 3 unterschiedliche 
Gruppen eingeteilt. 
HH-Gruppe:  Sowohl „1“-Promoter als auch „2“-Promoter erhalten WEITERHIN 12 € 
pro Stunde (HH = „1“-Hoch & „2“-Hoch). 
TT-Gruppe: Sowohl „1“-Promoter als auch „2“-Promoter erhalten NEU 9 € pro Stunde 
(TT = „1“-Tief & „2“-Tief). 
H_T-Gruppe: NUR „2“-Promoter erhält NEU 9 € pro Stunde, „1“-Promoter erhält 
WEITERHIN 12 € pro Stunde (H_T = „1“-Hoch & „2“-Tief). 
HH Woche 1 (FR / SA)  Woche 2 (FR / SA) 
„1“-Promoter: 12 €/Stunde 12 €/Stunde 
„2“-Promoter: 12 €/Stunde 12 €/Stunde 
   
TT Woche 1 (FR / SA)  Woche 2 (FR / SA) 
„1“-Promoter: 12 €/Stunde 9 €/Stunde 
„2“-Promoter: 12 €/Stunde 9 €/Stunde 
   
H_T Woche 1 (FR / SA)  Woche 2 (FR / SA) 
„1“-Promoter: 12 €/Stunde 12 €/Stunde 
„2“-Promoter: 12 €/Stunde 9 €/Stunde 
In allen Teamleiter-Unterlagen werden die Gruppen jeweils mit HH, TT und H_T bezeichnet. 
Die Gruppenzugehörigkeit ist im Einsatzplan vermerkt. 
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 Das Treffen vor einem Promotionseinsatz (TL)
Den Treffpunkt für die Teams vereinbart der TL. Die Treffen mit den unterschiedlichen Teams 
finden im Abstand von 15 Minuten statt (d.h. die Teams begegnen sich gegenseitig nicht!). 
VOR JEDEM TREFFEN: Der Teamleiter bereitet alle Materialien vor, die er für und die 
Promoter für die Promotion benötigen. Jacken und andere Promotionsmaterialien (s.o.) werden 
vor jeder Promotion verteilt und danach wieder eingesammelt. Der TL ist dafür verantwortlich, 
dass alle Promotionsunterlagen vorbereitet sind, insbesondere werden die Teamleiter- und 
Promoter-Protokolle korrekt vorausgefüllt (mit Datum, Aktionsort, Promoternamen, 
Verdienstgruppe (HH, TT oder H_T)). Die Informationen dafür entnimmt der TL dem 
Einsatzplan. 
Für die ClubPromotion gibt der TL gibt am ersten Tag des 2-Wochen-Blocks T-Shirts aus, die 
er erst am letzten Tag wieder einsammelt. 
Damit pünktlich mit der Promotion begonnen werden kann, vereinbart der TL ein Treffen für die 
Übergabe 20-30min vorher. Eventuelle Besonderheiten für die folgende Promotion werden hier 
besprochen. 
Bekanntgabe von Lohnänderungen (TL)
Woche 1:
ALLE Gruppen,  Lohnerhöhung
„Alle Promoter erhalten 12 € statt 10 € pro Stunde. Das hat der Chef so bestimmt.“ 
Woche 2:
Gruppe HH,   gleicher Lohn 
„Alle Promoter erhalten weiterhin 12 € pro Stunde. Das hat der Chef so bestimmt.“ 
Gruppe TT,   Lohnsenkung für beide 
„Alle Promoter erhalten ab jetzt 9 € statt 12 € pro Stunde. Das hat der Chef so bestimmt.“ 
Gruppe H_T,   Lohnsenkung für „2“-Promoter 
„Alle „2“-Promoter erhalten ab jetzt 9 € statt 12 € pro Stunde. Das hat der Chef so bestimmt.“ 
WICHTIG: Für die Kommunikation mit den Promotern (unter anderem bei Nachfragen) gelten 
besondere Regeln (s.u. „Kommunikationsrichtlinien“). 
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 Durchführung eines Promotionseinsatzes (TL)
Der Teamleiter 
1. ist der erste am Treffpunkt und bereitet Übergabe vor 
2. gibt den Aktionsradius (Streetpromotion) vor 
3. achtet darauf, dass die Promoter möglichst weit voneinander entfernt aufgestellt sind 
4. macht nach Möglichkeit Fotos von „Kunden“ 
5. ist in regelmäßigem Abstand bei beiden Teams vor Ort 
6. versorgt mit Nachschub 
7. entsorgt vom Kunden weggeworfenes Material (Flyer,Tickets) 
8. achtet auf die zeitliche Begrenzung 
Ende eines Promotionseinsatzes (TL)
Der TL sammelt die Materialien und Unterlagen wieder ein. Er rechnet zusammen mit den 
Promotern die verteilten / verkauften Ticketsätze ab und füllt mit ihnen das Promoterprotokoll 
aus. Dann können die Promoter gehen. 
DANACH füllt der TL das Teamleiterprotokoll aus. 
Nacharbeit (TL)
Der TL trägt Datensätze in die OnlineDatenbank von nachtausgabe.de ein. Dazu gibt es eine 
kurze Einweisung und kann dann nach jeder Promotion erfolgen. Die ausgefüllten 
Promoterprotokolle, Teamleiterprotokolle, Flyer-Abrisse, Cash-Listen usw. sind nach Ende der 
letzten Promotion im Dezember im NA-Büro Berlin abzugeben. Bargeld kann gegen Quittung 
auch vorher schon bei den Verantwortlichen Rafael Armbrust oder Oliver Schabelski abgegeben 
werden. Den gleichen Ablauf gibt es dann wieder im Januar vor dem Start unserer Aktionswoche. 
5. Überblick Promoter Tätigkeit 
Aufgaben
Bei kurzen und prägnanten Ansprachen ist mit dem Ausfüllen des Flyers ein Gespräch nach 3min 
beendet. Wir kalkulieren jedoch mit einem Schnitt von 4-5min. Das ergibt 10-20 Ticketsätze je 
Stunde. 
Unsere Promotion konzentriert sich auf 3 Stunden je Einsatz. Wir sind an den Hotspots und in 
den angesagtesten Clubs der Stadt unterwegs. Wir finden mehr potentielle Gesprächspartner vor 
als wir ansprechen können.  
Die Aufgabe eines jeden Promotionsmitarbeiter ist es jede Person im geschätzten Alter von 18-30 
Jahren anzusprechen und möglichst kurz und gezielt auf die Aktion hinzuweisen, mit dem 
Ergebnis:
Je 2 Tickets 
 für 5,00€ verkauft oder 
 Anmeldung des Kunden durch Ausfüllen des Flyer 
Bei Ausfüllen des Flyers wird die Anmeldung abgetrennt und verbleibt bei uns! Der Kunde erhält 
den Flyer. 
Die Karten werden sorgsam bis zum Promotionsende aufbewahrt und dann dem Teamleiter (TL) 
übergeben. Anschließend wird auch das eingenommene Geld mit dem TL verrechnet. 
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 6. Kleidung- und Materialhandhabung 
6.
Vorn Hinten
  STREET-Promotion – Ausstattung 
Erkennung: 
1. Windbreaker, gelb (AktionsBrand)
2. Schlüsselband 
3. Klemmbrett zur Präsentation 
Materialvorrat:
4. Gürteltasche, schwarz 
(unter der Jacke zu tragen) 
5. Brustbeutel, dunkel-blau 
(unter der Jacke zu tragen)
Hinweis: Bitte warm anziehen! 
Gürteltasche
In der Gürteltasche werden Flyer und Tickets aufbewahrt 
Brustbeutel
In den Brustbeutel werden ausgefüllte Gewinnspielkarten (Flyer-Abriss) eingesteckt, sowie entgegengenommenes 
Bargeld. 
Klemmbrett
Präsentation Flyer,  
Listen – Notieren der Daten des Teilnehmers durch Promoter (nur bei trockenem Wetter) 
Vorn Hinten 
  CLUB-Promotion – Ausstattung 
Erkennung: 
1. T-Shirt, gelb (AktionsBrand)
2. Schlüsselband 
3. Klemmbrett zur Präsentation 
Materialvorrat: 
4. Gürteltasche, schwarz 
(unter dem Shirt zu tragen) 
5. Brustbeutel, dunkel-blau
Hinweis: Bitte für Club – schwarze Hose + schwarzer Pulli! 
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 7. Do’s and Don´ts (Promoter) 
Do’s
 Einträge in den Promotionsplan sind verbindlich 
 Pünktlich beim verabredeten Treffpunkt erscheinen 
 Bei eigenem Ausfall mind. 6h vorher bescheid geben  
 Begeisterung für die Veranstaltung und Spaß an der Tätigkeit 
 Gut gelaunt und überzeugend sein 
 Zügige Ansprachen 
 Lesbarkeit und Richtigkeit der Angaben garantieren, dazu selbst für den Kunden den 
Flyer ausfüllen und den Ausweis/Personalien zeigen lassen (kostenlose Tickets gibt’s nur 
für richtige Angaben, sonst 5€) 
 Sorgfältiger Umgang mit überlassenen Materialien 
 Auf jeder Anmeldung Kürzel notieren 
 Rückfahrt selbstständig planen. Die Teamleiter sind dafür nicht zuständig.  
Don'ts
 Kurzfristiges Absagen   
 Unpünktlichkeit 
 Schlecht gelaunt sein und im Team seine schlechte Laune verbreiten 
 alkoholische Getränke während der Promotion trinken 
 Lange Raucherpausen (max. 5 Minuten pro Stunde) 
Ansprechpartner
Für die Tätigkeit vor Ort ist Ihr Ansprechpartner immer Ihr zugewiesener Teamleiter, der für Sie 
auch alle Informationen zu Ihrer Tätigkeit bereit hält. Für Rückfragen steht Ihnen die 
nachfolgende Adresse des Nachtausgabe Regionalbüros zur Verfügung. 
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 8. Kommunikationsrichtlinien (TL) 
In Gegenwart von Promotern AUF KEINEN FALL erwähnen: 
 Studie der Universität Zürich 
 Andere Verdienstgruppen 
 Den anderen 2-Wochen-Block 
 Nachträgliche Kontrolle der gesammelten Adressen 
In Gegenwart von Promotern betonen: 
 Die Nachtluft-Aktion ist einmalig, keine spätere Weiterbeschäftigung 
 Einteilung in „1“- und „2“-Promoter ist zufällig geschehen und hat nichts mit der 
Promotertätigkeit zu tun. Einteilung hat abrechnungstechnische Gründe 
 Das Promotionsziel von 10-20 Ticketsätzen pro Stunde ist unverbindlich und hat keine 
Auswirkung auf den Verdienst 
Bei Nachfragen von Promotern antworten: 
 „Warum gibt es Promoter 1 und 2?“
Antwort: Das wurde nur aus abrechnungstechnischen Gründen eingeführt. 
  „Warum ändert sich der Lohn?“ 
Antwort: Keine Ahnung, das hat der Chef so entschieden. 
 „Ich habe erfahren, dass andere Teams anders bezahlt werden…“
Antwort: Davon ist mir nichts bekannt, ich werde das abklären. 
 Alle anderen Fragen/Kommentare:
Antwort: Das ist halt so, der Chef hat uns das so mitgeteilt. 
9. Verhaltensrichtlinien (TL) 
 Alle Promoter GRUNDSÄTZLICH GLEICH behandeln, d.h. insbesondere keine 
unterschiedlichen Motivationen oder Bestrafungen aussprechen.
 Keine aktive Leistungskontrolle der Promoter. Die Promoter dürfen sich nicht ständig 
beobachtet oder kontrolliert fühlen (z.B., wenn der TL zum Fotografieren vorbeikommt).
10. Zahlen zum Nachtluft Ticket 
 Ticketsatz (=2stk), regulär    5,-€ 
 Ticketsatz (=2stk) bei Anmeldung   kostenlos (1x pro Kunde) 
 Gültigkeit      9 Tage ( 16.1.-24.1.09) 
 In Berlin & Hamburg gültig bei über 50 Partnern  
Bitte setzen Sie die Anleitungen in Ihrem Handbuch um, damit alle Ziele erreicht werden und 
auch alles ordnungsgemäß abgerechnet werden kann. 
Herzlichen Dank – Ihr Nachtausgabe-Team 
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Accounting Protocol for Team Leaders
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Procedural Protocol for Research Assistants
Checkliste
GENERELLES 
Aufgabenaufteilung 
- Hiwi1 leitet die Gespräche 
- Hiwi2 kommt erst bei der Raumeinteilung zum aktiven Einsatz  
Erwähne auf keinen Fall, …  
- dass ein Experiment stattfindet! 
- wie viele Bucheinträge erwartet werden! 
Es ist wichtig, … 
- dass ähnliche Fragen auf gleiche Weise beantwortet werden! 
- dass keine willkürlichen Begründungen abgegeben werden!
1. VOR DEM ERSCHEINEN DER STUDENTEN 
Arbeitsplätze Studenten: 
  Räume mit „Büchereingabe Staatswissenschaftliche Bibliothek – Bitte nicht stören“ kennzeichnen 
  Räume öffnen, Licht anmachen 
  Computer anmachen 
   Eingabemaske starten (CSV-Datei wird dann automatisch auf dem Desktop generiert) 
   Internet Explorer-Link sichtbar 
   Keine weiteren Dateien auf dem Desktop 
  250 Bücher und Kisten für erledigte Bücher bereitlegen. 
 
Aufsichtsplatz Hiwi1: 
  Gruppen- und Raumeinteilung (GEMISCHTER/GLEICHER RAUM), sowie Lohnsystem 
(TEAM/WETTBEWERB) überprüfen  
  Anleitungen für die Büchereingabe bereitstellen 
  Merkblätter Entlohnung bereitstellen (TEAM blaues Blatt, WETTBEWERB grünes Blatt) 
  Rechnungen bereitstellen  
  Protokoll versteckt (!) bereitstellen 
 
Arbeitsplatz Hiwi2: 
  Codierblätter bereitstellen 
 
2. STUDENTEN EMPFANGEN 
Vor der Eingangstür: 
  Sind alle Studenten vor der Eingangstür, dann begrüße sie: Sind sie die Aushilfen für die 
Büchereingabe? Herzlich Willkommen zum Job für die Büchereingabe, mein Name ist [Name], 
bitte folgen sie mir. 
  FEHLT EIN STUDENT: Rufe ihn auf sein Handy an und versuche die Arbeitsgruppen zu 
vervollständigen 
  Führe die Studenten zu einem Arbeitsplatz 
   Vorführ-Laptop mitnehmen 
   Anleitungen für die Büchereingabe mitnehmen 
   Merkblätter Entlohnung mitnehmen  
   Zeige ihnen den Weg zur nächsten Toilette (auf dem Weg zum Arbeitsplatz erledigen.) 
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3. BÜCHEREINGABE ERKLÄREN  
Hintergrund der Büchereingabe erklären: 
  Bibliotheksbestände der Staatswissenschaftliche Bibliothek sollen elektronisch erfasst werden. 
Bisher wurden die Bücherbestände noch nicht einheitlich für ein elektronisches Datenbanksystem 
erfaßt. Damit dies in Zukunft einfacher wird, brauchen wir diese Daten elektronisch erfasst. 
  Ihre Anstellung ist auf 4 Stunden begrenzt (BEI RÜCKFRAGEN: es war unklar, wie viele 
Studenten sich melden würden, ebenso wie lang die gesamte Erfassung dauern würde. Dieses 
Eintragen in kleinen Schritten erleichtert die Organisation.).
Büchereingabe erklären: 
  Anleitungen für die Büchereingabe überreichen: Bitte lesen sie als Erstes die Anleitung für die 
Büchereingabe sorgfältig durch. Die Anleitung erläutert jeden Arbeitsschritt und soll sie bei der 
Büchereingabe unterstützen.  
  Vorführung Büchereingabe am Laptop (nicht an einem Computer der Aushilfen) 
   Eingabemaske starten und erklären 
   Bücherinformationen beispielhaft zeigen 
   Bucheingabe vormachen 
   Nochmals auf „Besondere Hinweise“ und „Problemlösung“ eingehen 
  Jeder Student erfasst ein Buch – Kontrolle ob Eintrag korrekt
  Haben sie noch irgendwelche Fragen betreffend der Büchereingabe? 
Arbeitsgruppen (A und B) bilden: 
  Bevor wir sie nun zu ihrem Arbeitsplatz führen, teile ich sie in Arbeitsgruppen mit jeweils 2 
Personen ein. Ihr Lohn 
  ist abhängig von der Leistung der anderen Person in ihrer Arbeitsgruppe. Wie sich ihr Lohn 
genau bestimmt erklären wir Ihnen später wenn sie sich an ihrem Arbeitsplatz eingerichtet haben. 
   BEI RÜCKFRAGEN: das machen wir immer so und das hat sich so bewährt. 
Raumeinteilung: 
  Die Studenten werden gemäß ihrer Raumeinteilung zu ihren Arbeitsplätzen geführt – jeder Hiwi 
ist für einen Raum verantwortlich! 
  GEMISCHTER RAUM: Studenten A1 und B1 gehen bitte mit [Hiwi2] mit, A2 und B2 bleiben 
bei mir. 
  GLEICHER RAUM: Studenten A1 und A2 gehen bitte mit [Hiwi2] mit, B1 und B2 bleiben bei 
mir. 
  BEI RÜCKFRAGEN: Davon habe ich nicht so viel Ahnung, aber es wurde mir gesagt, dass ich 
darauf achten soll, und deshalb mache ich das jetzt so.  
  FEHLT EIN STUDENT: GLEICHER RAUM und Student aus unvollständiger Arbeitsgruppe 
sitzt alleine im Raum (falls zwei Studenten fehlen, bilde eine Arbeitsgruppe und GLEICHER
RAUM)
Entlohnung: 
  TEAM: Ihr Lohn besteht aus (i) einem festen Stundenlohn und (ii) einem leistungsabhängigen 
Lohn. Der feste Stundenlohn beträgt €3.50/h. Der leistungsabhängige Lohnanteil ist abhängig von 
der Anzahl vollständiger Bucheinträge ihrer Arbeitsgruppe. Am Schluss werden die Bucheinträge 
von ihnen und ihrem Gruppenmitglied zusammengezählt. Jeder Bucheintrag dieser Summe wird 
mit €0.20 vergütet. Der Gesamtbetrag wird anschliessend gleichmässig auf beide 
Gruppenmitglieder aufgeteilt. Die Berechnung ihres Lohnes ist nochmals auf dem Merkblatt 
erklärt. Merkblatt für die Entlohnung (blau) übergeben. 
   FALLS STUDENT ALLEINE ARBEITET: Lohn besteht aus (i) einem festen Stundenlohn 
und (ii) einem leistungsabhängigen Lohn. Der feste Stundenlohn beträgt €3.50/h. Der 
leistungsabhängige Lohnanteil ist abhängig davon wie viele Bücher Sie erfasst haben. Pro 
Bucheintrag erhalten Sie zusätzlich €0.10. KEIN MERKBLATT FÜR DIE ENTLOHNUNG 
ÜBERGEBEN. 
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  WETTBEWERB: Ihr Lohn besteht aus (i) einem festen Stundenlohn und (ii) einem 
leistungsabhängigen Lohn. Der feste Stundenlohn beträgt €11.00/h. Der leistungsabhängige 
Lohnanteil ist abhängig von der Anzahl vollständiger Bucheinträge die sie im Vergleich zu ihrem 
Gruppenmitglied eingeben. Für jeden Bucheintrag, den sie mehr eingeben als ihr 
Gruppenmitglied erhöht sich ihr Lohn um €0.10. Für jeden Bucheintrag den sie weniger eingeben 
als ihr Gruppenmitglied verringert sich ihr Lohn um €0.10. Das Gleiche gilt für ihr 
Gruppenmitglied. Die Berechnung ihres Lohnes ist nochmals auf dem Merkblatt erklärt. Merkblatt 
für die Entlohnung (grün) übergeben. 
   FALLS STUDENT ALLEINE ARBEITET: Ihr Lohn beträgt €11.00/h. KEIN MERKBLATT 
FÜR DIE ENTLOHNUNG ÜBERGEBEN.
  Da ihre Arbeitsdauer 4 Stunden beträgt, ist ihr Arbeitseinsatz um [Zeit] Uhr zu Ende. Ich werde 
dann vorbeikommen und ihnen den Lohn auszahlen. 
  Wir bitten sie, die Büchereingabe möglichst sorgfältig zu erledigen. Geben sie so viele Bücher ein 
wie möglich. Sie haben genügend Bücher vor sich, sodass sie ungestört durcharbeiten können. 
Falls Ihnen die Bücher ausgehen sollten, sagen Sie mir bitte kurz Bescheid. Ich lasse sie nun 
alleine, bis später.  
  Senden von SMS an Hiwi, der im Labor sitzt zur Orientierung über Endzeit der Büchereingabe 
4. WÄHREND DER BÜCHEREINGABE 
Protokoll führen (am Aufsichtsplatz Hiwi1) 
Lohnauszahlung vorbereiten: 
  Geld  
  Rechnungen 
   Falls alleine gearbeitet wurde, muss der Personalfragebogen (siehe Rückseite Rechnung) nicht 
ausgefüllt werden 
 
5. NACH DER BÜCHEREINGABE 
 
Lohnauszahlung (nach 4 Stunden Arbeitszeit): 
  Jeder Hiwi ist jetzt für eine Arbeitsgruppe verantwortlich 
   GLEICHER RAUM: jeder Hiwi geht in den Raum für den er verantwortlich ist 
   GEMISCHTER RAUM: beide Hiwis gehen zuerst in denselben Raum (sagen vorher den 
Aushilfen im anderen Raum, dass die Zeit nun zu Ende sei und sie aufhören können), bestimmen 
die Leistung des Studenten ihrer Arbeitsgruppe – dann wechselt ein Hiwi den Raum zusammen 
mit seinem Studenten und schickt den Studenten der anderen Arbeitsgruppe aus dem anderen 
Raum zum anderen Hiwi 
  Löhne bestimmen (Taschenrechner) und Rechnungen (inkl. Personalfragebogen) ausfüllen lassen 
   BEI RÜCKFRAGEN: Wir würden uns z.B. gerne anschauen, inwiefern der 
Tippgeschwindigkeitstest verbessert werden kann, damit wir auch in Zukunft gute Aushilfen 
rekrutieren können. 
   Beim Ausfüllen der Rechnungen (inkl. Personalfragebogen) möglichst die Kommunikation 
zwischen den Gruppenmitgliedern verhindern  
  Hier ist ihr Geld. Besten Dank für Ihren Einsatz. 
6. EINLADUNG VERHALTENSSTUDIE 
  Haben sie Interesse noch zusätzlich Geld zu verdienen? …  
  Forscher der Volkswirtschaftlichen Fakultät führen zurzeit eine größere Studie durch und 
benötigen noch Studienteilnehmer. Wir wurden angefragt, nach zusätzlichen Studienteilnehmern 
Ausschau zu halten. Wenn Sie möchten, können sie sofort an der Studie teilnehmen. Ein Hiwi wird 
gleich vorbeikommen um sie abzuholen. Das Ganze dauert inkl. Weg etwa 30 Minuten. Sie 
erhalten für die Teilnahme €7.00 sofort in bar ausbezahlt und können zusätzlich noch mehr Geld 
verdienen. 
  Manuel steht schon vor der Tür und erläutert noch die Studie etwas genauer.  
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   Falls ja: Hiwi begleitet Studenten zum MELESSA 
  Falls keine Zeit: Sie haben auch die Möglichkeit zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt an der Studie 
teilzunehmen. Schreiben sie Ihre Email-Adresse auf damit wir diese weitergeben können. Sie 
werden dann von der Studienleitung zur Vereinbarung eines Termins kontaktiert. 
7. AUFRÄUMARBEITEN 
Daten speichern: 
  CSV-Datei auf Memory Stick speichern und bezeichnen (ID Aushilfe gemäß Einsatzplan) 
  CSV-Dateien Hiwi-Notebook speichern 
Codierblätter ausfüllen 
Arbeitsplätze aufräumen und für den nächsten Einsatz vorbereiten: 
  Schmierereien und alte (i) Merkblätter Entlohnung und (ii) Anleitungen für die Büchereingabe von 
den Arbeitsplätzen entfernen! 
  Bücher bereitlegen 
  CSV-Datei auf dem Desktop und im Papierkorb löschen 
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Task Instructions for Workers
Anleitung für die Büchereingabe 
Für jedes Buch müssen Sie folgende Informationen eingeben: 
 Vollständiger Titel und Untertitel 
 Autor (Bsp.: Vorname Nachname) 
 Weitere Autoren (falls vorhanden), mit ";" trennen (Bsp.: Vorname Nachname; Vorname 
Nachname)
 Verleger/Verlag 
 ISBN-Nummer, ohne "-" eingeben (Bsp.: 1234567890)
 Erscheinungsjahr 
Auf den ersten Seiten eines jeden Buches findet sich immer eine Seite ähnlich der Folgenden: 
 Klicken Sie mit der linken Maustaste in das erste Feld der Eingabemaske, um mit der Eingabe zu 
beginnen 
 Mit der Taste ’Tab’ oder per Mausklick wechseln Sie von einem Feld zum nächsten 
 Nutzen Sie den Nummernblock, um die ISBN-Nummer einzugeben. 
 Wenn Sie ein Buch vollständig eingegeben haben, können Sie mit der Taste ’Enter’ oder per 
Mausklick auf ’Speichern’ das nächste Buch eingeben. 
 Die aktuelle Eingabe kann per Mausklick auf ’Löschen’ gelöscht werden.
Die Eingabe für das obige Beispiel sieht wie folgt aus: 
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Besondere Hinweise: 
 Titel wie "Professor", "Dr.", etc. müssen nicht eingegeben werden 
 Bei "seltsamen" Buchstaben (wie Ø etc.) nehmen Sie den "ähnlichsten" lateinischen Buchstaben 
 Römische Ziffern als Großbuchstaben eingeben (Bsp.: "IV" anstatt "iv") 
 Bei Sammelbänden nehmen Sie den Herausgeber als Autor 
 Folgende Angaben sollten nicht als Autoren erfasst werden: 
 Reihenherausgeber (Bsp.: "Schriften von …") 
 Übersetzer 
 Wenn es mehrere Erscheinungsjahre gibt, dann geben sie das aktuellste ein 
 Bei mehreren ISBN-Nummern geben Sie immer die erste ein 
 Geben Sie immer die ISBN-Nummer ein, nicht die ISSN-Nummer 
 Doppelte Bücher müssen getrennt eingegeben werden 
 Klappen Sie nicht das Display vom Laptop herunter. Dadurch wird er in den Ruhezustand versetzt 
 Bitte ändern Sie nichts an den Einstellungen des Laptops 
Problemlösung: 
 Bei Computerabsturz den Computer neu starten und per doppeltem Mausklick die Eingabemaske 
neu starten 
 Falls die Eingabemaske nicht mehr funktioniert, mit den Tasten ’Strg’ + ’Alt’ + ’Entf’ die 
Anwendung beenden und die Eingabemaske neu starten 
Falls Sie ein Problem nicht selbst lösen können, melden Sie sich bei der Hilfskraft draußen im Gang. 
102
Incentive Scheme Handout for Workers
Merkblatt für die Entlohnung 
[Wettbewerb] Ihr Einkommen besteht aus: 
 einem festen Stundenlohn von €11.00/Std und 
 einem leistungsabhängigen Lohn. Dieser ist abhängig von der Anzahl vollständiger
Bucheinträge, die sie im Vergleich zu ihrem Gruppenmitglied eingeben. Für jeden Bucheintrag 
den sie mehr eingeben als ihr Gruppenmitglied erhöht sich ihr Lohn um €0.10. Für jeden 
Bucheintrag den sie weniger eingeben als ihr Gruppenmitglied verringert sich ihr Lohn um €0.10.
Das Gleiche gilt für ihr Gruppenmitglied. 
Ihr Einkommen setzt sich wie folgt zusammen: 
Fester Stundenlohn 
€11.00/Std · 4 Std = €44.00 
+/-
Leistungsabhängiger Lohn 
In Abhängigkeit ob Sie mehr oder weniger Bücher eingetragen haben: 
Lohnaufschlag Anzahl Bücher, die Sie mehr eingetragen haben · €0.10 
Lohnabzug Anzahl Bücher, die Sie weniger eingetragen haben · €0.10 
[Team] Ihr Einkommen besteht aus: 
 einem festen Stundenlohn von €3.50/Std und 
 einem leistungsabhängigen Lohn. Dieser ist abhängig von der Anzahl vollständiger
Bucheinträge ihrer Arbeitsgruppe. Am Schluss werden die Bucheinträge von ihnen und ihrem 
Gruppenmitglied zusammengezählt. Jeder Bucheintrag dieser Summe wird mit €0.20 vergütet. 
Der Gesamtbetrag wird anschließend gleichmäßig auf beide Gruppenmitglieder aufgeteilt.
Ihr Einkommen setzt sich wie folgt zusammen: 
Fester Stundenlohn 
€3.50/Std · 4 Std = €14.00 
+
Leistungsabhängiger Lohn 
Alle Bucheinträge Ihrer 
Arbeitsgruppe  
Ihre Anzahl Bucheinträge 
+ Anzahl Bucheinträge Ihres Gruppenmitglieds 
Leistungslohn Ihrer 
Arbeitsgruppe 
Alle Bucheinträge Ihrer Arbeitsgruppe · €0.20 
Ihr Leistungslohn Leistungslohn Ihrer Arbeitsgruppe
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